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
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1982 Tournament Go

Below we present, somewhat belatedly, our annual round-up of the previous year's tournament scene.

Kido Prizes for 1982

'Kido' announced the following prizes in its March 1982 issue.

1. The outstanding player of the year: Cho Chikun, Meijin, Honinbo & Judan, also Kisei challenger. This is the third year in a row for Cho — once again there was no other candidate.

2. The highest number of wins (7-dan and up): Kobayashi Koichi (42 wins, 17 losses).

3. Best winning percentage (7-dan and up, minimum 24 games): Ishida Akira, Kobayashi Satoru (both 79.5%).

4. Most consecutive wins (7-dan and up): Ishida Akira (14). Second was Kobayashi Satoru with 12 and third Otake Hideo with 11.

5. The special merit prize: Kataoka Satoshi 7-dan, for winning the Tengen title.

6. The fighting spirit prize: O Rissei 7-dan.

7. The prize for technique: Ishida Akira 9-dan.

8. The outstanding woman player: Kobayashi Reiko (15 wins, 13 losses).

9. The 'new face' prize: Yoda Norimoto 4-dan (41 wins, 11 losses). Yoda won the fighting spirit prize last year.

1982 in Statistics

Top ten prize-winners

1. Cho Chikun: ¥61,580,000 (approx. \$256,000)
2. Fujisawa Shuko: ¥31,550,000
3. Otake Hideo: ¥24,710,000
4. Kobayashi Koichi: ¥24,020,000
5. Kato Masao: ¥22,040,000
6. Rin Kaiho: ¥20,740,000
7. Takemiya Masaki: ¥15,200,000
8. Sakata Eio: ¥13,080,000
9. Kataoka Satoshi: ¥11,890,000
10. Hane Yasumasa: ¥10,930,000

Highest number of wins (7-dan and up)

1. Kobayashi Koichi: 42—17
2. Cho Chikun: 34—13
3. Rin Kaiho: 32—21
4. Ishida Akira, Kobayashi Satoru: 31—8
6. Kataoka: 30—11—1 jigo; Otake: 30—17
8. Awaji Shuzo: 29—12; Sakata: 29—13
10. Hane: 28—10; O Rissei: 28—11



Ishida Akira — entered Meijin league, promoted to 9-dan, 2nd in 7th Kisei 8-dan section.



O Rissei — won 7th Kisei 6-dan section, reached playoff of 30th Oza, won 1st prize in Oteai.

Best winning percentage (7-dan and up)

1. Ishida Akira, Kobayashi Satoru: 79.5%
3. Hane: 73.7%
4. Ishii Kunio 9-dan: 72.7%
5. Cho Chikun: 72.3%
6. Kataoka: 72.1%
7. O Rissei: 71.8%
8. Kobayashi Koichi: 71.2%
9. Awaji: 70.7%
10. Sakata: 69%

Dishonourable mentions

Some of the players one might have expected to see on the above lists:

- Fujisawa Shuko: 11—19 (36.7%)
Kato Masao: 26—20 (56.5%)
Ishida Yoshio: 23—13 (63.9%)
Takemiya Masaki: 25—19 (56.8%)
Kajiwara Takeo: 15—8 (65.2%)



Kobayashi Satoru – youngest of the four Kobayashi siblings. Had a good year in 1982, but it's about time he made his move for a big title.

1982 Tournament Year

February

4th Kakusei: Cho (defeated Hashimoto Shoji)

14th Haya-go Ch'ship: Kobayashi Koichi (defeated Yamabe 2–1)

29th NHK Cup: Sakata (defeated Sugiuchi)

March

1st NEC Cup: Takemiya (defeated Otake)

6th Kisei: Fujisawa Shuko (defeated Rin 4–3)

April

20th Judan: Cho (defeated Otake 3–1)

May

7th Kisei: Hane won 8-dan, Sato Masaharu won 7-dan.

June

7th Kisei: Ushinohama won 9-dan.

Chinese team tours Japan, wins 43–13.

July

4th Women's Kakusei: Kobayashi Reiko (defeated Kusunoki 6-dan)

13th New Stars Tournament: Kobayashi Satoru (defeated Kanda 5-dan)

37th Honinbo: Cho Chikun (defeated Kobayashi Koichi 4–2)

August

7th Shinjin-O: Kataoka (beat Yoda 2–0)

7th Kisei Stage Two: Kobayashi Koichi (d. Hane)

September

7th Gosei: Otake (d. Cho 3–2)



Kajiwar Takeo – although he only rated a 'dishonourable mention', Kajiwar actually had a better than average year. However, his venomous tongue was as active as ever in criticizing the play of title-holders. This year Kajiwar is enjoying marvelous form and with 21 wins to 4 losses (as of Sept. 30) is leading the percentage race on 84%. Can he keep it up?

October

1st Women's Honinbo: Honda Sachiko (defeated Kobayashi Reiko 2–1)

23rd Okan (Crown – Nagoya): Yamashiro Hiroshi 8-dan (defeated Hane)

7th Meijin: Cho (defeated Otake 4–1)

November

30th Oza: Kato (d. Hashimoto Shoji 2–0)

December

7th Kisei Stage Three final: Cho beat Kato 2–0.

8th Tengen: Kataoka beat Kato 3–2.



Honda Sachiko 6-dan – Women's Honinbo

Rin Kaiho Comes Back from 0-3 to Take Honinbo Title from Cho

This seems to be the year for dramatic upsets. After a disastrous start in which he lost the first three games in the 38th Honinbo title, Rin made a great comeback to win the next four games and take the title from Cho Chikun, who ironically had won the Kisei title in similar fashion earlier this year. Following on Cho's loss of the Judan title, this setback has made a large puncture in the myth of his invincibility that has grown up in recent years. When it came to the crunch, Rin proved to be even more tenacious and unyielding than Cho; in winning his first title for five years, he seems to have regained the form that made him so formidable in his twenties, when he became Meijin-Honinbo at the age of 26. This is the second such upset that Rin has pulled off (the first was in defending his Meijin title against Ishida in 1973).

The intense competitiveness of this year's title match was evident in the final game, in which the players seemed to be vying to see who could play more slowly and perhaps psych the other out. On the first day only sixteen moves were played, undoubtedly a record slow pace for a title game, and by dinner on the second day the game had only reached the 44th move. The slowcoach tactics paid off for Rin, who convincingly outplayed his younger rival.

Incidentally, this was the first title match in which neither player was of Japanese nationality.

The results:

Game 1 (16, 17 May). Cho (W) won by resignation.
Game 2 (25, 26 May). Cho (B) won by resig.
Game 3 (8, 9 June). Cho (W) won by 7½ points.
Game 4 (22, 23 June). Rin (W) won by resig.
Game 5 (29, 30 June). Rin (B) won by resig.
Game 6 (14, 15 July). Rin (W) won by resig.
Game 7 (27, 28 July). Rin (B) won by resig.

39th Honinbo League. We were premature in writing off Sakata in our previous issue. Despite losing his place in the league, he promptly fought his way back in, together with Awaji Shuzo. The newcomers to the league are Yamashiro Hiroshi 8-dan and Takagi Shoichi 9-dan. They join Cho Chikun, Kobayashi Koichi, Takemiya Masaki and Iwata Tatsuaki in the 39th league.



Rin – Honinbo again, after 13 years

Otake Defends Gosei Title, Becomes Meijin and Oza Challenger

The second half of this year is becoming very hectic for Otake Hideo. First of all, he barely survived a surprisingly tough challenge for his Gosei title by Awaji Shuzo 8-dan – he just managed to hang on and defend the title with a lucky win in the fifth game. He has now held this title for four years in a row.

8th Gosei results

Game 1 (7 July). Otake (B) won by resig.
Game 2 (21 July). Awaji (B) won by 5½ points.
Game 3 (28 July). Awaji (W) won by resig.
Game 4 (17 August). Otake (W) won by 4½ points.
Game 5 (31 August). Otake (W) won by ½ point.

No sooner was the Gosei title finished than Otake began another return match with Cho for the Meijin title. Otake lost this title to Cho in 1980 and failed in his challenge last year, so this is his third time round. Unfortunately, he is having no better luck against Cho than in the past and, with only one win to three losses, is already faced with a kadoban. The results to date:

Game 1 (7, 8 Sept.). Cho (W) won by 1½ points.
Game 2 (20, 21 Sept.). Cho (B) won by resig.
Game 3 (28, 29 Sept.). Otake (B) won by resig.
Game 4 (12, 13 Oct.). Cho (B) won by 1½ points.

Although his Meijin prospects are not looking the best at this stage, Otake does have another string to his bow. In the Oza playoff, held on

8th Meijin League (as of 23rd June)

Rank	Name	O	R	K	S	K	H	T	I.K.	I.A.	Score
1	Otake	—	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	7 — 1
2	Rin	0	—	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	6 — 2
3	Kobayashi	0	0	—	0	0	1	1	1	1	4 — 4
4	Sakata	0	0	1	—	0	1	0	1	1	4 — 4
5	Kato	1	0	1	1	—	1	1	1	0	6 — 2
6	Hane	0	0	0	0	0	—	1	1	0	2 — 6
7	Tono	0	1	0	1	0	0	—	0	0	2 — 6
7	Ishii K.	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	—	0	1 — 7
7	Ishida A.	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	—	4 — 4

Note: the players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

6 October, Otake defeated Rin by 8½ points and so will challenge Kato for the title. Otake has won the Oza title once, in 1975.

8th Kisei Tournament

The first and second stages of this tournament have now been completed. In the 9-dan final, played on 4 July, Rin Kaiho defeated Ohira Shuzo. The second stage, the all-dan playoff, was won by Awaji Shuzo. The results from the quarter-finals on were as follows:

Quarter-finals. Nakamura Shidehito beat Hashimoto Shoji, Kiyonari Tetsuya b. Honda Kunihiisa, Awaji b. Otake, Sonoda b. Hiko-zaka.

Semifinals. Kiyonari b. Nakamura, Awaji b. Sonoda.

Final. Awaji b. Kiyonari (25 August).

So far only two games have been played in Stage Three. Sonoda beat Ohira and Rin beat Kiyonari. The focus of attention in this stage is going to be on the performance of Fujisawa Shuko, who has to beat Nakamura and the winner of the Sonoda-Kataoka game to reach the playoff to decide the challenger.

Youngest Title-holder Ever: Yoda Wins Shinjin-O

Since becoming shodan in 1980, Yoda Norimoto (born in 1966) has been considered a player to watch in the future. He has now taken one step towards fulfilling that promise by winning the 8th Shinjin-O title and becoming, at the age of 17, the youngest title-holder ever. Yoda reached the final of this title last year also, but lost Q-2 to Kataoka; this year he made no mistake, defeating Miyazawa Goro 7-dan 2-0. His predecessors as winner of this tournament include Kobayashi Koichi and Ishida Akira — it will be in-

teresting to see if Yoda also goes on to bigger things.

Michael Redmond Reaches 3-dan

In an oteai game played on 28 September, Michael Redmond won promotion to 3-dan after dawdling for close to two years on 2-dan. This is the highest professional rank reached by a Westerner. We hope to present the promotion game in a later issue.

Berlin Wins International German Team Championship

Fielding a powerful team, Berlin took first place in the 4th International German Team Championship, held concurrently with Japan Week in Dusseldorf from 17 to 19 June 1983. With Manfred Wimmer 6-dan (of Austria, but now resident in Berlin) on board 1 and Jurgen Mattern 6-dan on board 2, backed up by Wolter 4-dan and Kitsos 4-dan, Berlin led the field with 15 points out of a possible 20. Wimmer scored 4-1, losing to Hasibeder but inflicting on Yoo, a Korean player who has been dominating recent European tournaments, his first tournament defeat. Mattern had a clean slate.

Second was the Vienna team (Hasibeder 6-dan, Wiltschek 6-dan, Novak 5-dan, Postl 3-dan) on 13½ points and third place was taken by Amsterdam (Rehm 5-dan, Rebattu 5-dan, Koopman 4-dan, G. Westhoff 3-dan) with 13 points.

1983 European Go Congress

The 27th European Go Congress was held at Edinburgh from 24 July to August 5, with about 150 entrants from 14 countries. This year, for the first time, there was no separate European

Championship: all the players competed together in the main tournament, run on the MacMahon system with the 'bar' at 4-dan. The winner, with an impressive 9 wins out of 9, was Janusz Kraszek 5-dan of Poland. Second with 7/9 was Terry Stacey 5-dan of Great Britain, and equal third were Matthew Macfadyen 6-dan of Great Britain and Pierre Colmez 4-dan of France (the tie was not split). The most striking result from the lower part of the tournament was Max Muller 3-kyu of Austria, who won 8/9.

The weekend tournament was won by Yoon 5-dan of Korea, with second place shared by Terry Stacey and Gerald Westhoff 4-dan of Holland.

(Report from Richard Granville)

6th Australian Championships

The 1983 Australian Championships, held on 27-28 August, were the most successful yet: a total of 43 players competed, 28 in Section A for dan players and 15 in Section B for kyu players. This is the first time that there have been more dan-ranked players than kyu-ranked players.

Section A was won by Kwang Ho An of Sydney with a straight five wins. He will represent Australia in the 6th WAGC in Tokyo next year. Second was H. Fukuoka 5-dan of Japan on 4/5; third Ray Tones 4-dan of New Zealand on 4/5; and equal fourth were Graeme Parmenter 4-dan (N.Z.) and John Power (Sydney), also on 4/5.

Section B, a handicap tournament, was won by M. H. Park 2-kyu (Korea). Second was Chris Cheah 3-kyu (Canberra) and third was S. Kitamukai 9-kyu (Japan).

(Report from Bill Leveritt)

2nd Australia-New Zealand Match

The above tournament was followed by the 2nd Australia-New Zealand match, which, like the first, was an 8-8 draw. On paper the New Zealand team was outdanned, but it showed greater fighting spirit. Dae Hahn 6-dan of Australia won all his games, but Graeme Parmenter and Ray Tones of New Zealand made up for this by both scoring 3/4.

1983 Quebec Open Championship

Forty-five players from Montreal, Quebec City, Chicoutimi, Toronto, Ottawa and New Jersey participated in the 5th Quebec Open, held on 21-22 May. Upsets have become a tradition in this tournament, but this year saw the biggest of all when Jean-Paul Ouellet 3-dan beat three 5-dan

players to walk away with the championship. This is the first time ever that a player from Montreal has won the Quebec Open.

Second place was taken by Louis Leroux 5-dan (Montreal) and third by Harry Gonshor 5-dan (New Jersey).

Stacey to Challenge Macfadyen

Terry Stacey won this year's Challengers Tournament with a score of 7/7 and will challenge the British Champion Matthew Macfadyen. Second was Jim Barty 4-dan with 6/7. This tournament is an eight-player round-robin.

Computer Go Tournament in London

At the end of December, during the London Open Go tournament, a computer go tournament, the first of its kind in Europe, will be held. It is being sponsored by Acornsoft (a subsidiary of Acorn, the manufacturers of the BBC Micro-computer), who are offering a prize of £1000 for the winner. Programs must run on the BBC Micro and games are to be played on a 13 x 13 board with long time limits (2-5 minutes per move). For details, contact Richard Granville, 11 Mulberry Drive, Fruitlands, Malvern, Worcs. WR14 4AT, U.K.

Ishida Yoshio Leads Successful Tour of China

The Japanese are beginning to take the Chinese more seriously. This year they sent their most high-powered touring team yet on the regular goodwill tour of China. Led by Ishida Yoshio, the line-up was: Ishii Kunio, Kobayashi Koichi, Sonoda Yuichi, Sato Masaharu, Nakamura Shidehito, Yamashiro Hiroshi and Hasegawa Sunao. Leaving out players unable to take a break from tournaments, this was about as strong a team as you could put together, and a confident Ishida publicly predicted before the tour began that it would match the record of the 1973 team by scoring 40 wins (out of 56 games). Well, things did not go quite as well as that, but the team did rack up a winning score of 31 wins to 25 losses (plus two haya-go wins). Ishida himself let the side down by losing twice to Nieh Wei-p'ing and once to a 6-dan, though he did beat world amateur champions Shao (1981), Tsao (1982) and Ma (1983). The stars of the Japanese team were Kobayashi Koichi, who won all his games (including encounters with Nieh, Ma and Shao), and Sonoda, who scored 6-1. We hope to present some of the games in our next issue.

The Takadanobaba Go Club

Jon Wood

The Takadanobaba Go Club is probably the most internationally-minded of all the clubs in the Tokyo area. It offers classes in English, has a fluent English-speaker on its staff, and encourages foreigners to play and study there.

It is located on the 4th floor of the F1 building across the street from Takadanobaba station in Shinjuku. It is next to Byblos, a popular English-language bookshop. Both are owned by Yohan, Western Publication Distribution Agency, which specializes in importing and selling English books and magazines.



Hata Sensei explains a move to Brian Harrison while Rob van Zeijst looks on.

Yohan's interest in western things fortunately includes the Takadanobaba Go Club. Shortly after the club opened in 1980, it hired Hata Hidenao, 28, a strong 7-dan player, who lived in Australia and New Zealand for three and a half years and is fluent in English. He is the brother of Hata Hidefumi, professional 4-dan. The club then began offering courses in English in February 1981, with Hata as the teacher. The current class enrollment is five, ranging from 10-kyu to 2-kyu, and it meets once a week.

Perhaps the greatest attraction of the club, however, is its size. It is one of the largest in Tokyo, having ninety boards and 3,000 registered players. The average daily attendance is around 160 on Monday through Friday, 245 on Saturday, and 180 on Sunday, according to the manager, Shibayama Yasushi.

Every player registered at the club has a card bearing his or her rank in points. 0-9 points denotes a 9-kyu player, 10-19 an 8-kyu player, on up to 170-179 for a 9-dan. There are more than a hundred players registered at each rank from 4-kyu to 5-dan, with 64 6-dans, 33 7-dans, 8 8-dans, and one 9-dan. Each game a player wins adds one point to his score, while each loss loses a point. Thus players are able to go up (or down!) the ranks. The points are also used to figure out komis and handicaps. Because of the

high attendance, most players are able to find opponents of the same approximate rank.

One person who is happy that there are some very high-ranking players is Rob van Zeijst. The 21-year-old van Zeijst is the 1981 Dutch and European champion and is currently an insei at the Nihon Ki-in, studying to become a professional. He finished 12th in the 1982 World Amateur Go Championship, and one of his games is included in GW28. He gives his ranking as 6-dan and goes to the Takadanobaba Go Club about three times a week, because 'there are books to study and opponents stronger than myself whom I can play against.'

He also comments that it's very helpful for him to talk to Hata. 'It's convenient that Hata can speak English and that he is strong enough to explain high-level moves to me that other strong players can't.' Rob was featured at the club's third anniversary celebration on April 29th of this year when he played a two-stone haya-go game against Ogawa Tomoko, professional 4-dan, with commentary by Cho Chikun, Kisei. He lost by resignation, after putting up a strong fight.

In conclusion, the Takadanobaba Go Club is doing its best to serve the interest of English-speaking foreigners living in or visiting Japan who want to learn and play go.

Redmond v. Kajiwara

The following game was telecast on NHK, to an audience in the millions, on 11th February this year. It is of interest because it is the first game played by a Westerner against a 9-dan without a handicap. Strictly speaking, of course, Michael Redmond had the advantage of the first move and a 5½-point reverse komi, which is equivalent to a one-stone handicap, but the point is that until now Westerners playing public games against high-ranked players have always placed at least two stones.

Michael is at present the only Westerner active in Japanese professional go. He was born on 25 May 1963 in California. He became an insei in 1977 and made shodan in 1981. In November of the same year he was promoted to 2-dan. His teacher, Oeda Yusuke 8-dan, is confident that Michael will become a high-dan player in the future. He comments that Michael reads well and plays a solid game.

White: Kajiwara Takeo 9-dan

Black: Michael Redmond 2-dan

White gives 5½ komi. Time: 30 seconds per move plus 10 minutes 'thinking time' to be used at any stage. *Commentary by Oeda Yusuke 8-dan.*




Figure 1 (1 – 50)
19: connects (at 12)

Figure 1 (1 – 50). *Kajiwara's sacrifice strategy*

White 12. White 27 is usual, but then Black would press at 16. White plays all-out because of the reverse komi.

White 14. The first surprise from Kajiwara. Extending at 17 is the only move that would occur to 'ordinary' professionals. Kajiwara uses 12 and 14 as sacrifice stones to build up his moyo up to 24. Black has no reason to be dissatisfied with his thickness.

White 20. Oeda jokingly suggested that Kajiwara might continue in his sacrificial vein by extending at 23 with 20, but that would be giving up too much.

Black 21 is severe – 25 is also possible.

White 22. Starting a fight by extending at 23 is probably more usual, but White is concentrating on his moyo below.

White 24. White would like to switch to the top, but he cannot permit Black to hane at 24. However, he is forced into a disagreeably low position at the top when Black attacks at 25. Oeda was much amused by this, commenting that one rarely saw Kajiwara play so many stones on the second line.

Black 29 is severe. If Black extends at 'a', White jumps to 31 and Black's position is a little overconcentrated.

Black 37 completes a satisfactory opening for Black.

Black 39 is solid; a pincer would be more natural.


White 40 emphasizes territory, but it is a little dubious, as it gives Black a superb reducing move at 41. Perhaps 40 should have been at 41.

White 42. If White pushes up at 1 in Dia. 1, Black plays 2 and 4, then enters the corner at 6. That would be bad for White, but if he omitted 5, Black would get a good continuation at 'a'.

Figure 2 (51 – 100). *Invading the moyo*

White 56. A patient move. White would like to play at 57, but Black 'a' would be big.

White 58 is a tesuji. If White simply pushes through with 1 and 3 in Dia. 2, Black makes shape with 4 and 8 (he could also sacrifice two stones by playing 4 at 5). Even if White hanes



Dia. 1






Figure 2 (51 - 100)



Dia. 2



Dia. 3


at 'a' after 8, Black should be able to handle the fight.

White 58. Simply living with 74 is unappealing: White wants to counterattack in the centre.


Black 59. Black 'b', permitting White 59, would be bad.

White 60. If White plays at 1 in Dia. 3, he makes a more efficient cut than in Dia. 2, but he is afraid that Black will answer at 4. White cannot fight the ko after 6 (by cutting at 'a'), as he stands to lose too much from Black 'b-c' if Black wins the ko, so he will compromise with 7. However, this way Black has no trouble wiping out his moyo.

Black 69. A nervous moment for the spectators: had Michael completely read out the ensuing



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

12: connects

fight? The problem is what happens if Black plays 75 at 1 in Dia. 4.

Dia. 4. If Black 1 and 3, the continuation is forced. If White 18, Black plays 19 and wins the fight because of White's shortage of liberties. Therefore, instead of 18 —

Dia. 5. White has to play 18, but if Black resists with 19, a ko is unavoidable. Since it is Black's turn to take the ko and since he has more liberties, this would be an easy ko for Black to fight.

Black 75. Michael compromises. Since he is doing well in the game, he presumably does not want to take any chances. He does build thickness in the centre, but at the cost of giving White profit on the side.


Black 79. This deep invasion is aggressive; Black could also just make a light reducing move at 82. The aim of 79 is not just to invade but to drive the white group above out into the centre where Black's thickness should be useful. Note also that one of the main concerns of both players in the fighting that follows is to get sente to make the large move at 'c'.

White 80. If at 82, Black moves out with 84.

White 86. White 1 in Dia. 6 would make it too easy for Black. The latter would also get the aji of the peep at 'a' in the corner.

White 88 makes eye-shape and forestalls Black 96.

Black 91. To stop White from getting two eyes on the side.



Dia. 6





Figure 3 (101 - 154)



Dia. 7

Figure 3 (101 - 154). *White has a hard time.*

White 4. If omitted, Black takes away his eye with Black 'a', White 'b', Black 4, White 'c', Black 'd'.

Black 5. The vital point — moves like this are very irritating for the defender, comments Oeda. The fact that Black attacks at 5 shows that he considers the white group weaker than his.


Black 11. Black 'e' is usually correct shape, but in this case White would hane at 'f', giving him the option of capturing two stones later.

White 12. Not 'f' after Black 11 — Black 12 would endanger the corner group.

Black 13. Oeda would like to have seen Black 'g', which builds up the centre moyo and sets up a superb continuation at 'h'. Black 13 is steady: its main aim is to forestall White 'i' rather than to defend the cutting point. If White cuts at 1 in Dia. 7, Black captures him even without the stone at 13 in the figure.

White 14. White 24 would be more solid, but he has fallen behind in territory, so he has to play all-out.

Black 17. If at 18, White crosscuts and easily settles himself. If next White 18 at 20, Black settles himself easily this time with 28. Likewise, White 22 at 24, letting Black connect under-



Dia. 8

neath with 22, would be too mild. Both players are keeping up the pressure.

Black 31 is perhaps a little too aggressive. If Black simply blocked White's path into the centre with Black 42, White would have to link up along the top, so next Black could secure a large centre territory with 'h'. In the game Black drives White into the centre.

White 34. Necessary to help settle the white group, but this move is a minus for White. White 36 is necessary next because of the threat of the Black 36 — Black 'i' combination. Without the 34 — 35 exchange, White would have been able to push down (one line above 35), then connect at 36 in sente.

White 44. A probe — if played later, Black might pull back at 46.

White 46. A muttered 'this is painful' indicated that Kajiwarra was not enjoying the game. If White simply plays 46 at 49, Black solidifies his territory with 47, but White's prospects with 46 do not look good.

White 52. Starting a semeai with 1 etc. in Dia. 8 does not work. After 6 White is helpless.

Black 53. Fighting spirit calls for blocking at 54, which would be more consistent with Black's aggressive play so far. However, Michael has counted that capturing the three white stones is enough to win.



Redmond 2-dan




Figure 4 (155 – 200)
81: connects (above 73)

Figure 4 (155 – 200). A safe lead

Black 65. Black 86 is the usual move, but Black wants to threaten the eye-shape of the white group below. Black 65 does leave the possibility of a mannen-ko in the corner (with White 87, Black 'a', White 86, Black 88), but White does not have a chance to play it.

Black 67. Black's lead is safe.

Black 73 forestalls White 73, Black 'b', White 80. Black 73 is not sente, but it does have a good follow-up with 75 and 77.

White 86 forces Black to answer 88 at 89. If Black blocked at 95 instead, White would get a ko with 89.




Figure 5 (201 – 283)

41: captures (at 27); 51: connects (at 8);
83: ko (below 48). Both sides connect a ko.

Figure 5 (201 – 283). An impressive win

The game ended a jigo on the board, which is a most impressive performance for a 2-dan against a 9-dan. Michael showed that he has what it takes to play haya-go against a tough opponent. The day when he will be playing 9-dans on even can't be too far off.

Black wins by 5½ points.

(Translated by John Power.)



Michael Redmond and Kajiwaru battle it out.

21st Judan Title

Kato could not have approached this title match with too much confidence. He is hardly known for his lack of fighting spirit, but his record against Cho was too dismal. His overall record was a miserable 7 wins to 21 losses; even worse, he had been unable to make any dent at all on Cho in the title matches they had played. In 1975 he met Cho in the Pro Best Ten playoff: he lost 0–3. In 1981 he made his first and only challenge for the Meijin title: Cho crushed him 4–0. Then at the end of last year he also lost the Kisei playoff to Cho 0–2. A string of reverses like this would be enough to dampen anyone's self-confidence. At one stage, from early 1979 to late 1981, Kato lost eleven games in a row to Cho. One can appreciate that it was not just modesty on Kato's part when he commented before the series began that he would be happy if he could just pick up one win against Cho, let alone take the series.

There were positive factors on Kato's side, however. He has always done very well in the Judan tournament and he won the title for four successive terms, from 1976 to 1979 (14th to 17th Judan). This is second only to Sakata's tally of five Judan titles and ahead of Otake's three. Also, Cho was preoccupied with the Kisei title. The Judan title match started between the 5th and 6th Kisei title games, when Cho was in the midst of staging his recovery after losing the first three games. He could not have had very much energy left over for the Judan match, so this was an ideal opportunity for Kato to get his revenge for past humiliations.

An additional incentive for Kato to win the Judan title was that doing so would restore him to second place after Cho in the honour roll of title-holders. Since losing the Tengen title, he had had to yield precedence to the twenty-four year old Kataoka, which must have been galling. All in all, this was a very important match for Kato.

Game One

White: Kato Masao, Oza

Black: Cho Chikun, Meijin, Honinbo & Judan


Komi: 5½; time: 6 hours each

Played on 3 March 1983 in Shimoda City, Shizuoka prefecture. *Commentary by Kato.*


Figure 1 (1 – 32). Ishida Akira's new pattern

Black 11, 13. A combination invented by Ishida Akira. The standard move is Black 1 in Dia. 1, which initiates a very long joseki. Just for reference, the full sequence is shown here. The interesting part comes when White counterattacks with 14 in Dia. 2. Black is dissatisfied with the result because the marked stone makes his position a little overconcentrated.

White 16. Black gets very solid shape with 17, so perhaps White should have pushed through at 1 in Dia. 3, creating a weakness at 'a', before



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

17, 19: connect




Figure 1 (1 – 32)


playing 3. (Ishida Akira commented that White 1 was essential.)

White 20 is a probe. If White had played there with 18, he could have lived, though in gote.

Black 25. If at 1 in Dia. 4, White will set up a ko with 2 and 4. Even if he loses the ko, getting two moves elsewhere will be good enough.

White 26. White must play lightly: if 26 at 27, Black 'a' looks ominous.

White 28. Kato regretted playing 28 when Cho




Dia. 3

Dia. 4

answered at 29. If 29 at 'b', 28 becomes a good forcing move and White can also force with 'c' later, but 29 is a strong answer. If White 30 at 'd', Black will attack strongly with 'e', White 'f', Black 'g'. If White plays anything here, it will have to be around 'h', but the result when Black secures the bottom area by playing under 28 would be disappointing. Kato wished that he had played 28 at 32.

White 30. It's a moot point whether this is a good forcing move. If Black invades the corner with 1 and 3 in Dia. 5, then the White 'a'—Black 'b' exchange is clearly bad for White (it loses White 'b', for example).



Dia. 5

Dia. 6

Dia. 7

Figure 3 (33 – 67). Yielding to temptation

Black 33. Black is tempted to make this invasion in order to make the 30–31 exchange in Figure 1 bad for White. If White had omitted 30, he probably would not have bothered with this corner. As will be seen fifty moves later, the final result of the clash initiated by 33 is bad for Black, so ironically White's dubious move at 30 served a good purpose. Cho Chikun commented after the game that he should have emphasized the centre by making a shoulder-hit at 'a' with 33.

White 36 is a good move. If White intercepts with 1 in Dia. 6, then after 2 to 9, White cannot answer 12 in Dia. 7 at 13 as he loses the semeai. White therefore has to play 13 in Dia. 8, but giving Black the squeeze with 14 and 16 would be bad.

Black 37. If at 38, White builds up an excellent position with White 37, Black 59, White 'b' (or 'c').

White 42. If at 1 in Dia. 9, White wins the fight







Figure 2 (33 – 67)



Dia. 8



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

in the corner, but Black builds up centre influence with 2 to 10. This would be to Black's liking.

Black 47. If at 48, White plays 'd' and his moyo looks more promising than Black's.

White 54. A fierce attack reminiscent of the old Kato. White is trying to exploit the fact that White 'e' is sente against the corner group (threatening to kill with White 'f'.)

Black 61. Black could capture the three white stones with 1 in Dia. 10, but White 2 is painful. Next White would attack the group on the side with 4 and 6. Since White 'a' is sente against the corner, Black comes under a lot of pressure.

Black 65. Necessary to stop White from getting the ko in Dia. 11 (next page).

Black 67. Black 1 in Dia. 12 (next page) is also reasonable. White sacrifices and squeezes.





Figure 3 (68 – 100). *White takes the lead.*

Black 69. If at 80, White will block at 99. Instead, Black attacks with the peep at 69. White plays 70 to 76 to defend against Black 'a'.

The result to 80 is a success for White. He has not only lived inside Black's prime territory but also captured two stones in doing so. The game is now promising for him. Fifty moves later it became clear that 33 in Figure 2 was an overplay.

Black 83 is a severe move. If White carelessly answers at 1 in Dia. 13, Black crosscuts with 2. After 3 to 7, Black makes the peep at 8, cutting off and killing White's group.

White 100. White 'b' is more solid, but Black would invade at 100 and probably swallow up the white stone to the left.

Figure 4 (101 – 150). *Cho starts to catch up.*

White 6 is solid, but Kato was very tempted to increase his territorial lead by playing at 7.

Black 15 to 19 surprised Kato. He had expected Black to live simply as in Dia. 14. Cho was behind, so he had nothing to lose by the

Judan Prize Money

1st prize: ¥5,500,000



2nd prize: ¥1,100,000

Match fee: titleholder – ¥1,500,000

challenger – ¥1,000,000

(¥240 = US\$ 1.00)

(A list of Judan titleholders is given on page 17 of GW29.)



23: ko

emergency measure of playing the ko.

White 24. A ko threat like 'a' is not good enough, as White's group at the top might die if he loses the ko. He has to play in the neighbourhood of his group with 24, but Black ignores him. Since Black then lives on the side with 29 to 33, he makes a large gain in this ko fight. Once again Cho has proven how tenacious he is, especially in the late middle game.

White's continuation to 40 does set up a large cut at 'b', however, so he gets some compensation for losing the ko. He does not play at 'b' immediately as it is more or less miai with 'c' at the bottom.






Figure 5 (151 - 200)



Dia. 15 10 connects



Dia. 16

Figure 5 (151 - 200). Kato's slack endgame


White 52. As it turns out, White opts to play at the bottom.

Black 59. A mistake in order: Black should play 61 first (White 'a', Black 59, White 62 follow).


White 74 is a mistake: White should connect solidly at 1 in Dia. 15. If Black 2, White can then play 3; if next Black 4, White wins the semeai up to 15. When Black has played the hane at 75 in the figure, White is unable to win this semeai. Instead of 4 in Dia. 15, Black would have to play at 4 in Dia. 16. Even so, White would be able to take profit by harassing the group on the side.

White 90. Another slack yose move. White should make a placement at 93 before Black plays 91. White can take profit in the centre with 3 etc. in Dia. 17 and can still attack the group, though Black can live, thanks to his sente move at 'a'. Once Black plays 91 in the figure, White has to worry about his own eye-shape, so he is no longer able to make this severe attack.


White's slack moves have now made the game extremely close.



Dia. 17



Dia. 18



Dia. 19




Figure 6 (201 - 277)

65: connects (right of 23); 77: connects ko

Figure 6 (201 - 277). Both go wrong.

White 18 could have become the losing move: White must hane at 24 instead. That means that Black 23 is the losing move: Cho let Kato off the hook. Instead —

Dia. 18. If Black descends at 1 and White plays 23 in the figure (worth seven points in gote), then Black can play 3 to 7. This way Black would probably win by half a point. Alternatively, Black could just force with 1 in Dia. 19. This would give him a win by half a point or 1½ points.

White 24 is therefore the winning move. None of the later yose affects the outcome.

Kato had some anxious moments in this game as he saw his early lead gradually whittled down by Cho. He commented that it was a pleasant change to be on the right end of a narrow decision.

White wins by ½ point.

(Translated by John Power.)

Game Two

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Kato Masao

Played on 24 March 1983 at the Kyoto Century Hotel. *Commentary by Ohira Shuzo 9-dan.*




Figure 1 (1 - 40)

Figure 1 (1 - 40). Important second game

After his half-point loss in the first game, Cho went on to take the Kisei title from Fujisawa Shuko in the 6th and 7th games of the Kisei title and was effectively king of the go world. After that, everyone's attention was focused on who would defeat Cho, who would rip a title off him.


The first to try was Kato.

The second game is an important hurdle in a five-game series and it seemed to affect Cho and Kato in the same way. From the day before the match there was a somewhat tense feeling in the air.


White 12. Ohira and Hashimoto Yoshimi 9-dan, the referee, both approved of this move. If White plays the joseki with 1 and 3 in Dia. 1, Black 4 becomes a good extension.

Black 13 in response to 12 is absolutely necessary. Ohira: 'One is tempted to play the pincer at 1 in Dia. 2, but after the continuation to 8 Black has no substance. Black 1 is a good point, but letting White bear down on Black with 2 is disagreeable.'


White 14 to 18 are a necessary sequence. If Black plays 17 at 'a', White has the prospect of the severe move of 'b' in store after 18. 17, 18, and 19 were all played rapidly, but White 20



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

took nine minutes. The problem was deciding whether to push with 20 and then block with 22, or simply block at 22. In this case settling the shape with 20 and 22 was probably best.

Black 23. Ohira: 'It's difficult to know where to play 23, but the kakari of 1 in Dia. 3 gives White the splendid move of 4 after White 2 and Black 3. If Black plays 5, the combined extension and pincer of White 6 is another lovely move. That would be rather generous of Black. There is also the ogeima of Black 'a', but a move like White 'b' gives White influence extending from the top left along the left side.'

Black 23 to White 26 are a joseki, but Kato played Black 27 without stopping to think. Cho's White 28 is a tight move. Locally, playing at 30 is good shape, but letting Black extend to 28 would be painful. Extending two spaces, to 'c', with 28 would be thin; White 'd' does not look right either.

Attaching immediately at 30 in answer to Black

29 settles the shape. If 30 is omitted, Black 'e' becomes a good point.

Cho: 'White 34 (after 17 minutes thought) was a bad move.'

Ohira: 'Instinctively, I would want to play White 34. I can't find much wrong with it. White's positions are low overall, but they are all solid. This is Cho's style.'

So far the game had proceeded smoothly without any particularly unexpected moves, and neither player had got much territory. It looks like being a close game.

Everyone expected White 40: if it is at 'f', Black 'g', White 'h', Black 'i' is bad for White.




Figure 2 (41 - 65)


Figure 2 (41 - 65). Kato plays on a large scale.

Kato thought for 42 minutes before playing Black 41. Ohira: 'Black 42 would also be a good point, but something like White 'a' makes things difficult, since there are still the invasions of White 44 and 58. That is presumably why Kato played the large-scale move of 41. It's obvious that White will play 42 when he does so.'

Black 45 took ten minutes thought: the problem here was deciding which side to block from, but once this move had been played, the rest of the sequence in the corner followed rapidly.

Black 53 to 57 capture one stone. This sequence certainly seems typical of Kato's thickness-oriented style, but after the game he said: 'Black 53 should have been at 1 in Dia. 4 - there's no other move.'

Ohira: 'Black 1 is obviously a good point -



Dia. 4

there's the worry of White 2, of course. Kato probably disliked the continuation to 6. Black has territory in only one place and White can nibble away at it gradually. However, the moyo formed by Black 7 is respectable, and Black 'a' is also sente. White has territory everywhere, but it's in small pieces, so I think Black could play this way.' When White hanes with 2, Black must not save his stone with Black 4 as he will have a hard time after White 'b'.


The sequence to Black 57 is thick, but since White 52 is undermining that region, not much territory can be expected there.

Ohira: 'Dia. 4 would make it a different game. It's hard to say what White would do after 7. If he makes too deep a reducing move, he'll be subjected to a strong attack . . . Anyway, I can understand why Kato decided to go for thickness.'


Cho only thought for one minute about the shoulder-hit at 58: this reducing move works perfectly. If White played 58 at 'b', Black 62, White 'c', Black 'd' would be good enough for Black.

Black 59 and 61 are forced: grovelling with Black 1 to White 6 in Dia. 5 (next page) leaves Black in a low position. If Black cuts with 7, White simply sacrifices three stones with 8 and 10, and chases the black group on the lower side. Playing 61 at 1 in Dia. 6 doesn't make much difference: the black group below can still be bullied.


White 62 and 64 are good, light moves: the game is proceeding well for White. Next, connecting in answer to the peep at 65 would be submissive. Cho doesn't cooperate, but counterattacks strongly.




Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7



Dia. 8




Figure 3 (65 - 100)

Figure 3 (65 - 100). Cho sets the pace.


Ohira commented that deciding where to play Black 65 is not easy. The usual move is the push of 1 in Dia. 7; the sequence to Black 7 can be expected, and this would be better for Black than the actual game.

After the game Kato said: 'Pushing out with White 66 made Black thin; the sequence to 69 was terrible for me.'


White 70 and 72 immobilize Black 65 and also make the cut of White 'a' possible.

Black 73 to White 76 seem to be the only moves, but the fact that Black 77 is not sente against the corner is very upsetting for Black. Even if Black attacks White's eye-shape with 1 in Dia. 8, White saves his group with the 2-4 combination.

Cho thought for 24 minutes before jumping out to 78. Kato played 79 quickly. This softens the unpleasantness of White 'a' and also keeps the white groups above and below separated.



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

Cho took another 22 minutes before playing the keima of White 80, but after the game he was heard to regret it. 'I should have played at 1 in Dia. 9 first, then at 3 after Black 2. That would have been ideal.' Cho is the severest critic of his own moves.

Kato immediately played Black 81. This seems to be a calm, confident move, but Ohira commented that after Black 81 to 85, the game is not very good for Black. White has neatly dodged Black's thickness.

Cho connected with White 86 after 33 minutes; in the anteroom voices were raised in admiration at this tenacious move. Kato attacked with Black 87, but when he saw White 88 he retreated to provide a base for his stones with Black 89.

Cho: 'White 90 at 91 would have been more solid.' A sequence like White 1, Black 2, White 3

in Dia. 10 can be expected, but Black still has moves like 'a'.

Ohira: 'White 90 and 96 make White thick, but when Black settles the shape around 91, White's bottom group becomes a little thin.'





Figure 4 (101 - 154)

13: connects (at 10)



Dia. 11


Figure 4 (101 - 154). Large yose

Black 1 looks like a very strong move, taking advantage of the strengthened black positions surrounding it. No-one expected the kosumi of White 4, but it's a good move that blunts Black's attack.


Cho: 'I would have been in trouble if Black had played 1 at 1 in Dia. 11.' If White connects at 2, Black 3 is a good move. If White pushes through at 4, the continuation to 11 endangers his whole group, so he has to play 4 at 6. Black 4 and White 9 follow, but Black gets a good result by capturing the three stones with Black 5.

Cho: 'Does White take a chance with 2 to 6 in Dia. 12 then?'

Ohira: 'That's probably the best he can do, but it's still better for Black than the sequence in the game.'



Dia. 12



Dia. 13

Kato could see that there was no profit for him on the lower side, so he tidied up the lower right corner with Black 5 to White 16 before playing Black 17 with a loud bang. The large yose had begun.

White 22 is the correct order of moves: if at 24, Black hanes at 22.

When Black blocks with 27 and 29, White wedges with 30 to capture one stone and secure eight points of territory. This seems to be easy on White, but if Black plays 1 and 3 in Dia. 13, White can run into the centre with 4 to 10 and Black's lower left corner is in trouble.

Kato had been waiting for the chance to pounce with Black 41.

Cho regretted White 48. 'It looked as if that white group was going to die, so I connected, but playing at 'a' would have been better,' he said afterwards.

If the same sequence as far as White 54 is played, it's clear that White 48 is better at 'a'; but in answer to White 'a', Black probably connects at 52.






Figure 5 (155 - 200)

Ko: 79, 92, 97





Figure 6 (201 - 250)

Ko: 13, 16, 19, 22; ko (at 24): 37, 40, 43, 46, 49

When Black connected at 9, Cho slapped his knee in irritation. He was apparently unaware of the fragmented matchsticks scattered at his side (Cho is famous for his habit of playing with matchsticks while thinking). Kato's knees were seen to shake occasionally, but he wasn't muttering his customary cry of 'idiot' to himself.

Black captured a stone quickly with 23 after White 22 took the ko. Ohira commented that 23 decided Kato's half-point win. What would have happened if White had exchanged White 23 for Black 'd' before taking the ko at 10? When White



Dia. 14

Dia. 15

Figure 5 (155 - 200). A close finish

White 68 and Black 69 are both necessary. If White omits 68, Black 'a' would be big; and if Black omits 69, White can get rough with 1 in Dia. 14.

Black started a ko with 75 in answer to White 74. This seemed to seal his half-point win, but, as Ohira pointed out, the outcome was still not clear.

Cho had gone into byo-yomi of one minute during move 68.

Capturing two stones with Black 83 to 91 was big, but White was able to capture one stone with 88.

Black 85. If this is at 1 in Dia. 15, White 2 to 8 mean that even if Black pushes through with 9, White 10 ensures that Black gains nothing.

Figure 6 (201 - 250). The game is decided.

White 8 is a nice move; if it is at 'a', the two-point yose move of Black 'b', White 8, Black 'c' remains.




Figure 7 (251 - 307)

Ko: 60, 63, 66, 69, 72, 75, 84, 87, 90; 91: at 67; 92: takes; ko: 93, 98, 101, 104, 107. Black connects the ko.

plays 24 and Black gives atari at 25, connecting the ko is bad for White as Black would then be able to play at 'e'.

Figure 7 (251 – 307). *Half a point again*

When Kato took the ko with Black 307, Cho said in a low voice, 'Please connect the ko.' The game was over.

Neither player said anything for a while. Then Cho tugged at his hair and said, 'That was tough, amazing – it's probably half a point.'

There were many in the anteroom who thought that White had the half-point win, but . . .

Cho: 'Letting you capture those two stones (with Black 191) was a loss, and connecting at 148 also shook me . . .'

In the middle game, the erasure of White 58 to 66 were strong moves: the black stones seemed to have been dealt a body-blow. But Kato fought steadily and patiently, and gradually pushed back. This was a very difficult game because the outcome was never clear.

Cho also commented that he should have sealed Black in by playing to the left of 81 instead of at White 80.

Ohira said that the losing move was probably White 148. But since there was only a half-point difference in the result, it would be difficult to say where exactly the game was won.

Black wins by half a point.

(Translated by Louise Bremner)

Game Three

White: Kato Masao

Black: Cho Chikun

Played on 6 March 1983 in Atami.

Commentary by Otake Hideo, Gosei

After losing the first two games by a total of one point, Cho should have been under a lot of pressure going into the third game. But during the interval between games he made a trip to South Korea to celebrate. In his homeland he is a national hero and he was congratulated personally by President Chun. After his warm reception in Korea, he began this game in high spirits.

Figure 1 (1 – 27). *Kato's unorthodox play*

White 8. Invading so early is a brave move, according to Otake. Playing at 'a' at the bottom would be more usual.






Figure 1 (1 – 27)



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

3: connects


White 18 is unusual. White 1 in Dia. 1 is standard. After White 3, Black 'a' is the joseki move, but switching to 'b' would also be a good point. Presumably Kato did not like that. Otake felt that White lost points compared to the set pattern shown in Dia. 2 but that nonetheless White's strategy was acceptable because it made Black hurry to play 23 and set up an excellent continuation for White at 'b' in the figure.

White 24 is necessary. If White answers at 1 in Dia. 3, 2 and 4 are too good for Black.

White 26. Otake recommends playing White 1 in Dia. 4 (next page). In the sequence to 18, White gets solid territory but is shut out of the centre. Still, this is better than allowing Black 27



Dia. 3



Dia. 4




Figure 2 (28 – 69)


in the figure.

Figure 2 (28 – 69). *Black takes territory.*

White 30 – Black 35. This sequence is bad for White because the triangled stone prevents him from making his normal extension up the side. The only redeeming feature (and, apparently, the reason Kato played it) is that the white stones break the ladder that occurs as a result of White 36, Black 'a', White 41, Black 49. White's problem, of course, is that it is hard for him to find a good continuation in the top left after 27 in Figure 1. Attaching underneath at 45, for example, just gives Black a good hane at 'b'. White 'c' does not work either: Black reinforces at 'd', making miai of 42 and 57.

Black 37 induces White 38 so that connecting at 39 becomes natural. Black anticipates 41 to 49 after White captures at 40. White can't play at 'a' with 40 because Black cuts one line above.

White 50. Kato has no choice because of the triangled stone, though it is painful for him to give Black fourth-line territory. If Black makes a double hane with 51 at 1 in Dia. 5, White will cut, and fighting will begin. Since White has sente moves at 'a' and 'b', Black prefers the



Dia. 5

sequence in the game.

Black 57. Cho builds about 35 points of solid territory in the sequence to 69. This is a good example of his territory-oriented style.





Figure 3 (70 – 100)




Dia. 6 10: connects

Figure 3 (70 – 100). *An ineffective attack*


White 70 and Black 71 are miai.

White 74. If White follows the sequence in Dia. 6, Black gets sente for 12, which increases his territory enormously. White plays 74 to prevent this from happening. The drawback is that he is left with a weakness at 'a'.

White 80 fits Kato's aggressive, attacking style, but it is a bit of an overplay, according to Otake. It is meant to steal Black's eye-making potential,



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

but it results in pushing Black into White's moyo. White has many other possibilities, including 1 in Dia. 7, which eliminates the aji of Black 'a'. If Black 2, White 3 and 5 seem reasonable. Presumably Kato disliked this sequence because Black makes an eye with 4 and 6, securing his last remaining weak group. Note that Black can get an eye with Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c' at any time.

Black 93, 99. Otake: 'Black was probably relieved at being able to play 93. However, Black 99 is bad, as it gives White an excellent move at 100. If instead Black played 1 to 5 in Dia. 8, 'a' and 'b' would be miai, so White's attack would fizzle out. Black 3 would also revive the threat of Black 'c'.'

Figure 4 (101 – 150). *Unable to kill*

White 2 is a good move which starts a long and complicated fight. First it leads to a furi-kawari (exchange of groups) in which White gives up his stones on the side in exchange for a ko in the corner. Otake felt that this was good for Kato, because it complicated the game and gave him some chance of winning. If White saved his three stones by playing 2 at 5, Black would force with Black 4, and White would be unable to make much of an attack on the group above. The reason –

Dia. 9. If White 1 (assuming the forcing exchange mentioned above), Black 4 is sente against the corner, so White does not have time to take away his eye with 'a'. Black also has the option of making a counterattack against White's key stones in the centre with 'b'. This diagram shows that Black's group is fairly safe, which is






Figure 4 (101 – 150)
Ko: 18, 21, 24, 35, 38



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

why White was prepared to sacrifice his three stones on the side.

Black 23. Cho decides to counter invasion with invasion – instead of building territory, the game becomes a competition in destroying territory. White has too many ko threats on the right side for Black to fight the ko, so Black sets out to get life at the bottom. For his part, White sets the ko aside for a bit to secure life himself with 26 etc. – this group is too big to neglect.

White 34, attacking Black's eye-space in the corner, makes the ko deadly serious. Black cannot afford to lose this group after the damage he has suffered on the right side.

White 40. Kato has to finish the ko, because now Black has more ko threats, either against the right-side white group or to live at the bottom.

Black 41, White 42. Mutual defiance – kill if you can! Black 41 does threaten to kill with Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'. The status of Black's group is more difficult to work out, but, according to Otake, it cannot be killed. After 45 –

Dia. 10. If White 1, Black counters with 2 to 12. If White plays 13 to stop Black from connecting with 'a', Black lives with 14 and 16. If White continues with 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', Black 'e', White 'f', Black 'g', the result is a seki.

White 48. Kato realizes that he cannot kill Black, so he just plays here to settle the shape.




Figure 5 (151 - 193)

Figure 5 (151 - 193). *Cho survives the kadoban.*

Black 55. 74 and 83 are miai, so Black is alive.


White 58. Even if Black blocks at 'a', the white group is safe because White 'b' makes miai of 'c' and 64.

Black 59 is the biggest move on the board. It is really the final move in the fight beginning with White 2 in Figure 4, and it gives Black an unassailable lead. Cho has lived in White's territory, thus nullifying the gains Kato made on the right side. In addition, he has forced White to live there in gote, so he has time to save his corner stones with 59 even though he lost the ko. The game is as good as over.


White 72. Kato has no choice. White 1 in Dia. 11 is refuted by Black 2 to 6.

Black 85 and 87 are a neat tesuji combination. White cannot stop Black from connecting to the left of 89. If he blocks at 1 in Dia. 12, the corner becomes ko in the sequence to 11.

Black 91 is the coup de grace. If White doesn't play 92, Black can get a ko with 'd', White 92, Black 'e'. This would be a hanami (one-sided) ko for Black, as he would have nothing to lose.



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

However, Black 93 puts Black more than fifteen points ahead on the board, so Kato has to resign.

In conclusion, Otake praised Kato's courage in trying a new move (18 in Figure 1) in a big title game, although it didn't work out very well in this case. One reason for this is that Cho played well against Kato's 'surprise' and didn't make any big mistakes.

After Cho's incredible comeback in the Kisei match, Kato might have been feeling a little nervous.

White resigns after Black 193.

(Translated by Hata Hidenao and Jon Wood.)

Game Four

White: Cho Chikun


Black: Kato Masao

Played on 13 April 1983 in Matsuyama City, Shikoku. *Commentary by Okubo Ichigen 9-dan.*

Figure 1 (1 - 54). *Aerial fight*

White 12 may strike the reader as being a little early for a 3-3 invasion, but White was probably planning to play here when he made the irregular kakari at 6. Instead of 12 -

Dia. 1. If White makes the ordinary approach move at 1, he gets a cramped position with 5 because of the low position of Black's stone to the left of it.



Dia. 1





Figure 1 (1 - 54)



Dia. 2

Black 13. Which side to block on? The rule is to block on the wider side, which seems to call for Black 14 rather than 13. However, if Black does so, then after the joseki concludes, giving the shape in Dia. 2, White 1 there becomes an ideal erasing move.


White 20. Crawling the extra space is unusual. If fighting later spreads into this area, 20 might become a bad move, as it loses aji and strengthens Black. On the other hand, Black might get to block at 20 first. Even so, White 20 is a 'business-like' way of playing.

White 26. If White does nothing here, Black 29 becomes a good move.


Black 31. If at 32, White 31 would be big.

Black 33 determines the direction of the game. Black is also tempted to build up his moyo by pushing up with 1 etc. in Dia. 3. However, White would calmly take territory with 8, and it would be hard to see him losing. If Black continues to expand his moyo with 9, White 10 is hard to stop.

White 40. A fighting move, Cho-style: he takes profit at the bottom, confident that he can look after his centre group. White 40 forestalls Black 'a'. Perhaps White rejects the ordinary-looking



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

exchange of White 41 - Black 'b' because that would weaken White's influence on the left side.

White 42 is a good move. If White makes an ogeima (above 53) instead, Black would press the attack with 42, driving White towards Black's thickness.

Black 43. The kogeima at 50 would make loose shape, so the impulse to attach at 43 is understandable. However, White takes yet more profit up to 52. Note that cutting at 'c' with 50 would be bad: the ladder favours White, but Black has a good answer at 'd', making miai of 'e' and 'b'.

White already has a decisive lead in territory. Black has to come up with a good attack on the centre group.

Black 53 looks like the vital point. If Black 'f' instead, White would easily settle himself with 'g'.

White 54 is a truly superb move: at one blow it deflects the main force of Black's attack. If Black answers at 1 in Dia. 4, White easily makes shape with 2 to 8. This way Black would get no compensation for the territory that White has taken at the bottom.





Figure 2 (55 - 100)




Dia. 5


Figure 2 (55 - 100). Cho in complete command

Black 55 is bad shape, but it seems to be the best and strongest move. However, Kato very much regretted cutting next at 57, since that just helped White to fix up his shape. Instead –


Dia. 5. Kato wished that he had just pulled back at 1. This way there is a big difference from Dia. 4 in the respective thickness of Black and White when he continues with 3 and 5. After White reinforces with 6, Black pushes up with 7 and 9, then invades at 11. Black temporarily abandons his attack in the centre, but White is not yet completely secure there. Black can also expect to pick up some points on the left side, so this would make the game even. Just for reference, the two players agreed after the game that they would have continued with White 'a' through to Black 'f' after 11.




Dia. 6



Dia. 7



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

White 58 must have been a very satisfying move for Cho: it completes the job started by his clever move at 54 in Figure 1. This hane makes White's group very resilient. Black resists strongly with 59, but White exploits the fact that there is no ladder for Black (i.e. with 65) to make the forcing move at 62. From this point on the game becomes an uphill struggle for Black.

White 66 is a little funny, considering that White tenukies next. Perhaps Cho was confident that he would get the chance to play 80. Instead of 69 –

Dia. 6. If Black plays at 1, he can be sure of capturing the three stones, but he collapses when White hits him with the 2 – 4 combination. If Black 'a', White 'b'; if Black 'c', White 'a'.

White 70. White has saved his centre group in sente at the cost of sacrificing three stones. When he switches to 70, he takes a clear lead in territory.

Black 71. If at 72, White 71.

Black 73. Ordinary moves are not enough. Black 1 in Dia. 7, guarding against the danger of White 80 in the figure, would be more solid, but defending the side with 2 would be more than good enough for White. Invading the corner with 3 would make no impact on White's lead.

Actually, instead of 73 —

Dia. 8. Black 1, a kind of emergency measure, looks strong. Black is prepared to play a ko after 3 and 5 (i.e. White 'a', Black 'b'), since he has ko threats against the centre white group. If White 2 at 'c', Black should be able to live with Black 'd', White 5, Black 'e'.

Black 73 tries to compete on territory, but White 80 (White keeps 'a' in reserve) is severe. In fact, it decides the game.

White 84 is a solid thump that takes all the wind out of Black's attack. Black is helpless. For example, if Black tries to cut with 1 and 3 in Dia. 9, White's counter with 4 and 6 knocks him off his feet.

Black 87 is an attempt to make Black's attack in Dia. 9 feasible. If White answers Black 'a' there at 'b', Black can catch 6 in a ladder with 7 at 'c'. Not surprisingly, White ignores 87 in the figure.

White 90 completely reverses the roles of attacker and defender. Black is hard-put to find an adequate answer. If Black 91 at 'b', Black's centre group would probably drop off after White 93.


Black 99. If Black reinforces against the cut with 1 in Dia. 10 (he answers White 'a' with 'b'), he might have a chance if White captured part of his group with White 3, because then he could attack the white group above with Black 2. However, his prospects look very bad if White calmly answers at 2, then attacks with 4 and 6.

For that reason, Black defends at 99. He is defying White to do his worst.

Figure 3 (101 – 140). *Making it easy for Cho*

Black 5 – 9. This cut is a desperate attempt to fight his way out of trouble. However, Kato regretted not first exchanging Black 8 for White 'a'. The difference that this would make is shown in Dia. 11.

Dia. 11. If Black cuts (5 and 7 in the figure) after making the marked exchange, White secures



Dia. 10

Dia. 11




Figure 3 (101 – 140)

his connection with 1 and 3. Black then plays 4 to 8 — if next White 'a', Black plays 'b' and captures on a larger scale than in the game. There is no guarantee that Cho would have followed this sequence, but at any rate the marked exchange cannot be bad for Black and just might have given him a chance of winning.

After eliminating his one source of anxiety with 8, Cho followed a safety-first policy in winding up the game. Black was able to live in the corner with the odd-looking move of 11, but White takes the key point of 22, putting him slightly ahead on the board.

Figure 4 (141 – 178). *Another upset?*

Cho's play in this game was very impressive:




Figure 4 (141 - 178)

he hardly played a bad move. After his recovery, surviving two kadobans, the general feeling was that he looked like staging another upset. His play in the third and fourth games was so masterful that one got the impression he was unbeatable when he could bring his full attention to bear on a game (that is, with the Kisei match out of the way). Kato had said before the start of the series that he would be happy to win just one game, but at this stage he was probably far from happy.

Black resigns after White 178.

(‘Igo Club’, June 1983. Translated by John Power.)

Game Five

White: Kato Masao

Black: Cho Chikun

Played on 27 April 1983 at the Nihon Ki-in

Commentary by Ishida Yoshio

Figure 1 (1 - 50). A severe blow

Black 1, 3. An unusual opening.

Black 35 is a good move. It may help White to make good shape with 36, but if Black does nothing here, White has a good move at 37. Also, if Black peeps at 36 with 35, White may counter-attack at ‘a’.

White 38. White should first exchange White 39 for Black ‘b’.

Black 41. Possible because 49 or ‘c’ is sente.

White 42. This is the kind of move that loses games: Black 43 is too severe. Black now firmly seizes the initiative. Instead of 42, White must




Figure 1 (1 - 50)

jump to 43 (Black ‘d’, White ‘e’, Black ‘f’ might follow). Otake Hideo, who showed up in the ante-room at this point, commented that the game was just about over after 43.

White 46. White does not want to flee towards the top because of Black’s thickness at the top left.

Figure 2 (51 - 100). Cho increases his lead.


White 52, 54. Defying Black to do his worst to the centre group. Instead, Black stakes out a nice territory at the top with 55 to 59. Because of his weak group, it will be hard for White to touch this territory.

Black 61. Cho Chikun-style – he doesn’t need to attack the centre group directly. This move aroused the admiration of his fellow professionals.

White 62, 64. This is not a time to worry about good style.

Black 65. White was hoping for 1 in Dia. 1, which lets him destroy the corner black group.

White 66. If White hanes at 1 in Dia. 2, Black can now cut at 2. This time White’s squeeze ends



Dia. 1

Dia. 2





Figure 2 (51 - 100)




Dia. 3


in gote, so Black can counterattack with 8 etc. After 16 Black should be able to handle the fight. If instead White plays 66 at 1 or 'a' in Dia. 3, Black cuts with 2 and 4 and attacks the white group to the left. Kato's 66 is the only move that works.

White saves his groups in the exchange to 80 that follows, but Black is satisfied with the result. The lead he took with 43 in Figure 1 is becoming more and more definite.

Black 83. Black's sole remaining weakness is his position on the right side: the aim of 83 is to fix it up. White has no choice but to answer



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

at 84. If he plays 2 in Dia. 4 instead, Black scoops out his side territory with the sequence to 9. White 1 in Dia. 5 is no better; after 2 to 8, 'a' and 'b' are miai for Black.

White 86. The normal move would be to connect at 88, but in that case Black has made a clear improvement on the standard Black 85 - White 83 exchange. For that reason White counters with 86; although it lets Black dig deeper into his side, White can at least aim at attacking at 'a'.

Black 97. The first move by Cho in this game that is at all questionable. He should first have exchanged Black 'b' for White 'c'.





Figure 3 (101 - 120)

Figure 3 (101 - 120). *Cho's first slip*


Black 7 takes away White's reserve eye on the side, but instead of losing passively by just fleeing into the centre White makes a counterattack with 8.

Black 13. The move that Cho regretted most in this game. After 14 to 17 Cho expected White to play 18 at 1 in Dia. 6 (next page), in which case he would have the endgame sequence of Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', Black 'e' left for later, thanks to the 13 - 14 exchange in the figure. If Black 13 after White 1 in Dia. 6, White would just answer at 'a' in the diagram. When White switches to 18, however, the 13 - 14 exchange becomes a pure loss for Black. In effect, Black 13 makes it easy for White to sacrifice his two stones after Black 17.

Instead of 13, Black should have put pressure on the centre white group with 1 to 5 in Dia. 7.



Dia. 6




Dia. 7

This way White's group would still be insecure and Black could aim at pushing through at 'a'. Black would still have a safe lead.

Black 17. Black 18 is still better.

White 20. If Black had played correctly in the centre, White would never have got the chance to make this invasion. For the first time White can begin to feel hopeful about his position.






Figure 6 (201 - 257)

games in the 2nd Kisei (1978), the 18th Judan (1980) and last year's Tengen all by half a point. In this series he made up for his past bad luck with a vengeance. This is of course the first time in tournament history that a player has won a title solely on the basis of half-point wins.

Poor Cho's reign as the quadruple title-holder had not lasted long. Now he had only the Kisei, Meijin and Honinbo titles to his name.

White wins by ½ point.

Time used. White: 5 hours 59 minutes

Black: 5 hours 59 minutes

(Translated by John Power.)



1st Go World Invitational Cup

Hasibeder v. van Zeijst

'Go World' has founded the 'Go World Invitational Cup', the aim of which is to match top Western players against each other. Initially it will be played on an occasional basis, but ultimately the aim is to establish who are the top Western players. At present the cup only exists on paper; the players actually vie for a cash prize (too modest to be mentioned here) and each receives a match fee (twice as modest again).

To start the ball rolling, the 1st Cup was fought for by two top European players. Rob van Zeijst is the second Dutch player to become an insei at the Nihon Ki-in and is now playing in the B1 group. He won the European Championship in 1981, then aged 19. Earlier this year he played in the tournament for promotion to professional shodan, scoring a respectable 6 wins to 12 losses. His opponent is Helmut Hasibeder, who was born in Vienna in 1957. Helmut graduated from the Vienna University School of Medicine and from October 1981 to summer this year he carried out postgraduate research in neurology at Keio University on a Japanese Education Department scholarship. He won the European Championship in 1978 and is five times Austrian champion.




Figure 1 (1 - 52)

White: Helmut Hasibeder 6-dan

Black: Rob van Zeijst (then B2 group insei)

Komi: 5 points; time: 3 hours each + 1 minute byo-yomi. Played on 18 July 1983 at the Nihon Ki-in.


Text by Rob van Zeijst, in consultation with Kanda 6-dan.

Figure 1 (1 - 52)


White 10 gives a slightly unfavourable result. The joseki to Black 25 follows and White has no good follow-up, as 26 and 27 are miai.

Black 29 is heavy. Dia. 1 shows a better way of playing.

Dia. 1. After exchanging 1 for 2, Black secures a base while taking away White's eyes. White has




Dia. 1



Dia. 2

to defend with 12, so Black can make a shimari with 13. The result in the upper right corner looks bad for Black, but White used four stones to capture just one black stone and a black move around 'a' revives the aji of the marked stone. White is very thick, but the local result can be called even and Black has sente.

However, after White 32 in the figure the white stones on the left side begin to work, since Black 27 is weak and thus can be attacked (drive your



Dia. 3

opponent against your own thickness). On top of this, Black still has to add a move at 33. If omitted, a white move at 'a' would be severe.

After White 34, the joseki up to 44 seems inevitable. However, Black 45 is a mistake in direction. This should be at 1 in Dia. 2. If White 2, Black builds up a nice moyo with 3 and 5. If White cuts at 5 with 4, Black extends at 'a'. The fight that follows should be alright for Black.

White 46 to 52 are a resolute way of playing, making Black overconcentrated and building up white thickness. Following joseki with 46 at 'b' would be too gentle – see Dia. 3.

Dia. 3. White 1 to 5 form a set pattern. Next Black plays 6 to see what White will do. If 7, Black plays kikashi at 8 and then strikes at the vital point of 10. White can't do much better than patiently defend at 11, so Black plays 12, enlarging his moyo while helping the stones below. Since 'a' is sente, Black doesn't need to worry after White 13. Black now switches to the top, attacking at the vital point of 60 in Figure 2.


Figure 2 (53 – 72)

Black 55 should be at 1 in Dia. 4. White plays 2 to defend against Black 'a'; Black 3 then induces White 4, which makes Black 5 a natural move. White would probably then switch to 55 in the figure, a thick move that reduces Black's left side moyo and threatens the black stones at the top (5 and 27 in Figure 1) while aiming at a chance to undermine the black stones with a move at 'b' in the diagram.

Black 55 and 57 are preparation for an attempt to commit suicide with the stones at the top. Black has to flee at 63, but White 64 places Black on the horns of a dilemma. Black would like to hane at 68, but after the sequence to 10 in Dia. 5 he might die.

Black has no choice but to defend his weak stones, but 65 and 67 are bad. Black 65 at 'a' is a better point. If White blocks at 'b', Black plays 'c' and is safe for the time being.

Black 69 is risky, as White can push through



Dia. 4





Figure 2 (53 – 72)




Dia. 5

with White 'd', Black 'e', White 'f'. Black has to give way with Black 'g', White 'h'; if next Black 'i', the white stones create a lot of bad aji for Black. For example, White can exchange 'j' for Black 'k' and sooner or later Black will have to take the white stones off the board (sedomori). White also would have several forcing moves around '1'. Black 69 at 'f' was the honte, even though that lets White make a kikashi at 69 (Black answers at 'h').

White 70 is the vital point. Black 71 in reply could have become the losing move. Dia. 6 offers a better possibility.

Dia. 6 (next page). White connects with 4, but Black takes White's eye with 5 and 7. White has to add a stone at 8 to prevent a ko, so Black can now attack with 9 to 23. White cannot resist.



Dia. 6

This way White takes profit but at the cost of a weak group while Black gets thickness.



Rob van Zeijst




Figure 3 (73 – 100)

Figure 3 (73 – 100)

Black 73. Same comment as for 55 in Figure 2.

White 74 is meant as a kikashi, but it is risky. If Black played 1 in Dia. 7 and White answered at 2, Black could invade at 3, the continuation to 7 being best for both. Even though Black successfully invades, however, White would still be ahead, thanks to Black's passive move at 71 in Figure 2.


Black 75. Black has fallen asleep: this spiritless move ensures White's lead.

Black 87 should be at 88.

White 92 is an idle, amateurish move. White wants to wind up the game as quickly as possible, but he gets into trouble when Black counters with 93 to 5 in the next figure.

Figure 4 (101 – 150)

Black 15 is in the right direction, but 19 would be better, as White 16 is just right.



Dia. 7




Figure 4 (101 – 150)

34: connects.

Black manages to live in sente, but Black 47 is a slack move that should be at 'a'. Incidentally, White hallucinated that 46 was sente. White 48 and 50 are not to the point either. Defending with White 'b' – Black 'c' – White 'd' is the wisest course.

Figure 5 (151 – 197)

Finally the game ends in a spectacular double





Figure 5 (151 – 197)
76,92: ko; 97: at 57




Helmut Hasibeder

ko, leaving White with a dead group.
White resigns after Black 197.

Good and Bad Shape (continued from page 52)



Dia. 1




Dia. 2


to sacrifice the marked stone, he should do so in more thorough-going fashion. The natural move is to hane at 1, then connect at 3, or alternatively simply to descend at 3. This way the marked black stone virtually withers up and dies, but in compensation Black secures a large corner in sente.

Black's strategy in this corner varies considerably, depending on whether or not he decides to sacrifice the marked stone. However, one can say that Pattern B is the worst way of playing, because it falls between two stools.

Note that Black has no worries in his corner



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

after Dia. 2.

Dia. 3 (dead). If White attempts to invade at 1, Black crushes him with 2. Black is after all entitled to take the corner to compensate for giving up the outside stone. The only complication is that there is some aji at 'a' where White might be able to invade later instead of 1, but at least the corner is secure.

Dia. 4 (good shape). In this kind of position, Black 1 makes extremely good shape; it puts the finishing touch to a superb position. There is now no way for White to invade.

The comparison with Pattern B shows how efficient Black's position is in Dia. 4. Whereas Black had a narrow two-space extension from his corner there, here he has a four-space one. That just goes to show that the assessment of good and bad moves always depends on the overall position.

('Kido', February 1970. Translated by John Power.)

5th World Amateur Go Championship

For the third year in a row and the fourth time out of five championships, a Chinese player has won the World Amateur Go Championship. This time the victor is an eighteen year old prodigy who won the Chinese championship last year and who had already taken second place in the 1981 WAGC. Ma Xiaochun has only been playing go for nine years, but he has had the seal of approval stamped on him by Fujisawa Shuko and Nieh Wei-p'ing, who both predicted big things for him some years ago. Ma had no trouble with his Japanese opposition, defeating former world champion Imamura in the semifinal and the other Japanese representative, Miura Hiroshi, by 7½ points in the final. If Ma improves his fuseki, which Kato Masao, the chief referee for the tournament, comments is his main weakness, he should be a formidable opponent even for top professionals.

Although they missed first place, this year was




1983 World Amateur Champion Ma Xiaochun

not a disaster for the Japanese. Miura took second place and Imamura defeated the Chinese woman player Li Yang in the playoff for third place. European players also had a good tournament, as the list of placings given below indicates.

Placings

1. Ma (China)
2. Miura (Japan)
3. Imamura (Japan)
4. Li Yang (China)
5. Kim Chul-choong (Korea)
6. V. Danek (Czechoslovakia)
7. H. Wiltschek (Austria)
8. Jim Barty (U.K.)
9. Ronald Schlemper (Holland)
10. Miguel Flusser (Brazil)
11. Gun-ho Choi (U.S.A.)
12. Pierre Aroutcheff (France)
13. Juan Del Rio Salvarez (Spain)
14. John Blair (New Zealand)
15. Carlos Torres (Mexico)
16. Sergio Parimbelli (Italy)
17. Ping-fai Tsang (Hong Kong)
18. Dae Hahn (Australia)
19. Martin Dieterich (F.R. Germany)
20. Roberto Alaluf (Argentina)
21. Andras Gondor (Hungary)
22. Patrice Gosteli (Switzerland)
23. Christer Lindstedt (Sweden)
24. Gin-hor Chan (Singapore)
25. Janusz Kraszek (Poland)
26. Yoon-bae Kim (Canada)
27. Matti Siivola (Finland)
28. Dag Belsnes (Norway)
29. Milosav Jukic (Yugoslavia)
30. Dix Sandbeck (Denmark)
31. Jose Dalisay (Philippines)

Main Tournament



GAMES FROM THE FIFTH WORLD AMATEUR CHAMPIONSHIP

Championship Final

White: Ma Xiaochun (China)

Black: Miura Hiroshi (Japan)

This was Ma's second shot at the title of world champion. Two years ago he had been runner-up, losing to a fellow Chinese player by half a point in the final game. This year his final opponent was Japanese.

The two contrasted in ways other than nationality. Miura is a manager in a Tokyo construction company. Ma, who is exactly half his age, is still a high-school student. However, he is also go champion of China.





Figure 1 (1 - 53)

Figure 1 (1 - 53)

The point of White 12 is that if Black later trades 1 for 2 in Dia. 1, White still has the potential of descending at 'a'. In other words, due to the triangled exchange, Black cannot defend the corner in sente.



Dia. 1

Black 15 was slightly passive. For a more aggressive move, see the next game. However, White made an equally passive move at 16 and

let Black get off to a good start by extending to 17. White should have pincer at 17.

Black 35 is a standard invasion. Next Black plays either 'a' or 37, depending on which side White defends.

White 38 is a type of leaning strategy. White gains compensation on the lower side for the loss of the corner.

White 44 defended against Black 'b'.

Black 47 was a slight tactical error which Ma exploited with precision by making forcing moves at 48 and 50, then enclosing Black in sente with 52. Instead of Black 47, the correct way to live was to play 'c'.





Figure 2 (54 - 100)

Figure 2 (54 - 100)

Black 55 would have been slightly better at 69, but a more serious mistake was the attachment at 57. Black should have played diagonally at 1 in Dia. 2. The sequence through 13 is adequate for him. If White plays 6 at 7, Black gives atari at 'a'.



Dia. 2

By capturing five stones with 72, White moved into the lead.

Black now made an even worse mistake at 73. After the exchange from 73 to 80, there was no way White was going to answer the atari at 81. If Black had simply played 81 without the preliminaries, White would probably have replied at 'a', and Black could have used either the atari at 75 or the cut at 76 later on. Black fell further behind when White invaded the right side at 84.





Figure 3 (101 – 150)
ko: 27, 30, 33

Figure 3 (101 – 150)

Black made a bid to regain the lead at 3 and 5, and quickly got his chance as White slipped up at 6. Black 7 threatened Dia. 3, so White replied at 8, but it would obviously have been better to play 8 in the first place instead of 6.




Dia. 3

Black 11 was good, but both 'a' and 16 were bigger than Black 13. (White 12 should also have been at 'a' or 16.) When White played 16, it largely compensated for his loss at the top.

If White had made the correct response to Black 17 by standing at 23, his lead would have

been secure, but his hane at 18 gave Black a chance to spring the crosscut at 19, and the game became complicated again. When White made the further mistake of thinking Black would answer the atari at 22, he lost the lead to Black 23 and 25.

The correct move for White 22 is shown in Dia. 4. After 7, although the position is difficult for both sides, Black seems to be in more trouble.



Dia. 4

Black 39 and 41 attacked White's shape, but invited the counterattack at 42. Black should have just made a two-space jump to 44. The white groups to the left and right would then both be too weak for White to mount a very severe attack.





Figure 4 (151 – 200)

Figure 4 (151 – 200)

Black 47 (Figure 3) to 53 were a clever sequence, creating a shortage of liberties, but White ended Black's attack on the left by capturing two stones with 60. That left only the attachment at 61 on the right, but Black spoiled this chance by continuing at 63. White 64 and 66 reversed the lead for the last time.



Dia. 5

6: ko

Black should have given atari at 1 in Dia. 5. After the continuation through 8, Black 'a' is sente, so White cannot play 'b'. If White plays 4 at 'c', Black links up with 'd', White 'e', Black 'f'.

When White hollowed out Black's territory with 66 to 76, then got the good diagonal move at 78, the game was close on the board, without the komi. Black took the large point at 87, but this was balanced by White 94. White picked up a few more points in the next figure as Black made errors under time pressure.




Figure 5 (201 – 295)

52 at Δ . 53 gives atari below Δ . Ko: 89 (at 13); 92 (below 51). 93 at Δ . 94 at 51.

Figure 5 (201 – 295)

There is no denying Ma's reading ability and fighting strength, but Miura gave him a hard battle, getting the best of the opening and staying close, and briefly ahead, in the middle game. Whether Ma develops into a real superstar depends on his developing a better feeling for the opening.

White wins by 7½ points.

Play-off for 3rd place

Black: Imamura Fumiaki (Japan)

White: Li Yang (China)

After three consecutive all-male teams, this year the Chinese once more decided to send a woman, and the winner of the elimination tournament was 20-year-old Li Yang. Her opponent, Imamura, was playing in the championship for the third time and had won it once before.




Figure 1 (1 – 50)


Figure 1 (1 – 50)

In their final games, both Japanese players played the same 1-3-5-7 opening. This pattern was popularized by Kobayashi Koichi, 9-dan.

Black 19 was good. In the resulting shape, White threatens to turn at 29, followed by Black 28 and White 31. White can then live at the bottom, but this option is not available as long as White's main group is weak.

Black 23 attempts to make territory while attacking, but a two-space jump to 'a' would have been better. White strengthened herself at 24, then counterattacked at 26.


Black 33 amounted to a loss of nearly a whole move. Imamura may have been worried about White 1, 3, and 5 in Dia. 1, but in the continuation through 10, White is dead and Black easily wins the capturing race. The worst White can



Dia. 1

do is not 1, but only to play 'a' in sente.

White 40 was good shape, but White could have crushed Black at this point with 1 in Dia. 2. If Black answers at 2, White cuts with the tesuji at 3. If Black plays 2 at 'a' or 'b', White plays 2.



Dia. 2




Figure 2 (51 - 100) 98: ko

Figure 2 (51 - 100)


Black 51 should really have been at 60, but Black was too far behind to play honestly. White 52 permitted Black 53, but White had every prospect of making up for that by attacking the center.

White 60 and 74 were both comparatively small. White should have played 60 at 100 and 74 at 'a' on the upper side, moves which would have indirectly affected the center.

After 82, White felt ready to close in for the kill with 86, but as things turned out, it would have been better to play this move at 'a' too, for White made several mistakes in the subsequent attack..

The first was White 96. White 1 in Dia. 3

would have ended the game. If Black replies at 2, White plays 3 and 5, and Black is doomed to crash in ruin against the white wall to the left. If Black plays 2 at 'a' and tries to engage the white group below in a capturing race, he is doomed again, because White can make an eye in sente with 'b'.



Dia. 3




Figure 3 (101 - 151)

Figure 3 (101 - 151)

White 4 should have been at 19, to keep Black from cutting there, and from playing 9 in sente.

Black 9 was necessary. If Black just plays 11, White cuts with White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c'.

White finally lost the lead by being squeezed through 43. Black not only saved his center group, but secured a large top right corner, and

left behind a very large endgame hane at 'd'. There were various ways White could have prevented all this, the simplest being to play 20 at 21.




Figure 4 (152 - 205)

ko: 79, 82. 83 connects at 76; 88 at 55.

Figure 4 (152 - 205)

White made an attempt to catch up through the ko at 70, but lacked the ko threats to pull it off. When she ignored Black 97, it was clear that she was seeking a place to resign.

Despite the outcome, Li looked very strong in the opening and the first half of the middle game. Imamura may have won, but Li played better go.

White resigns after Black 205.

Play-off for 5th Place

White: Kim Chul-joong (Korea)

Black: Vladimir Danek (Czechoslovakia)

Last year Kim made a strong showing in the World Championship, beating a Japanese opponent to finish fourth. This year he lost to Miura in the quarter-finals, but then beat Wiltschek of Austria to arrive at the fifth-place play-off. Danek had lost to Ma in the quarter-finals, but then beat Barty of Britain. He is a mathematician with a five-year go career and a 4-dan ranking.

Figure 1 (1 - 56)

Black 7 expands from the Chinese 1-3-5 pattern, but its value is reduced because it approaches the low end of White's 4-6 enclosure.





Figure 1 (1 - 56)

Black 9 would be preferable.

White's "enchanted sword" pincer at 12 leads to many variations and has to be handled carefully, especially with White 8 already in place. Kim steered for largely uncharted waters with 14 and 16, but Danek fought back without giving an inch through Black 25. If Kim was expecting to gain a quick advantage, he must have been surprised. When Black plays correctly, this variation tends to backfire on White.


It would have been dangerous for White to persist with 1 and 3 in Dia. 1 instead of 26. Black should cut on the other side at 1 in Dia. 2. After 9, he still threatens to invade the top with 'a', followed by 'b' or 'c'.



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

White 44 was a tesuji to take sente. If White plays 1 in Dia. 3, he gets more profit, but ends in gote.



Dia. 3

Dia. 4

After missing the right cutting point in the top left, Black had to play aggressively to catch up, but unfortunately he did not. Black 49 should probably have been at 54, to take away White's base. Black 51 should have been 1 in Dia. 4.




Figure 2 (57 – 114)

Figure 2 (57 – 114)

Black 57 should have been at 60, and Black 61 at 'a'. When White was allowed to settle himself so easily, the game began to slip away from Black.

White 62 was greedy, and gave Black one last chance.

If Black had played 73 at 'b', the game would have turned on the fate of the four isolated white stones in the center. This would have been much more interesting than conservatively surrounding a small territory with 73.

When White linked up with 80, the game was over.

Black resigns after White 114.

Play-off for 7th place

White: Helmut Wiltschek (Austria)

Black: Jim Barty (United Kingdom)

Wiltschek has been representing Austria at the world championship every other year, and this time, by dint of a hard-fought victory over Dieterich of West Germany in the first round, he earned a place in the best eight. The outcome of this game may reflect partly a difference in experience: Wiltschek has been playing go for 21 years, Barty for 9.




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50)

An alternative to Black 13 was to play the taisha at 'a' and see how that turned out before settling the top right corner.

With Black 19 it would of course have been possible to develop Black 7 and 13.

However, Black 21 was an excellent move, putting Black in a position to play strongly later.

White 22 aimed at quick development, but the proper move was probably to defend the top with 'b'.


White 24 to Black 43 are the so-called Kajiwara joseki.

White 44 and Black 45 were both good moves.

Instead of 45, Black could also attack at 'c', but White would probably welcome the fight, considering his thickness.

With 46, White should once more have played 'b'.

Black 47 was the first really bad move of the game. Black should run out lightly at the top with 1 and 3 in Dia. 1. The sequence through 13 leaves him ahead.



Dia. 1




Figure 2 (51 - 100)


Figure 2 (51 - 100)

The trouble with Black 47 in Figure 1 was that after Black 51, the left side is open at the edge, so no matter how well Black plays tactically, he is operating in a relatively worthless part of the board, while White gets to develop in a good direction with 52.

Black should never have let himself be walled in by White 58. Instead of 57, Black should have jumped to 58, followed by White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', then Black 59 or 60.


After 58, Black would have liked to settle himself with 'd', but there was no time for that.

White 63 might have been better than 60. After 2 through 5 in Dia. 2, Black can fight a ko with 'a', but where his ko threats will come from is not clear.




Dia. 2

Black 61 was heavy. Since Black is playing inside White's zone of power, he should play more lightly, with 1 in Dia. 3. If White turns at 2, Black can play the double hane tesuji at 3 and 5, then jump out to 7.



Dia. 3

Dia. 4 shows that there is no point in White's slicing in behind Black ▲ with 1 and 3.



Dia. 4

White 62 and 64 were good, natural attacking moves. Black should have played 69 before 65, but it probably would not have made any difference.

Black lived with 73, showing that there was nothing wrong with his tactical reading ability, but the overall result still favored White. The game was demonstrating why Dia. 1 was correct.

Perhaps overly satisfied with the hard time he had given Black, Wiltschek made two careless moves at 74 and 76. These just made Black's position safer. If White had to do something,

he should have traded White 75 for Black 74. Then White 'e' would have threatened to kill the black group.

But White recovered with a good move at 78.

Black 79 was also good, but Black 85, White 'f', Black 79 would have been a little better.

White 80 was an overplay; White 'g' was the proper move. However, White 80 succeeded because of Black 81. If Black had answered 80 at 'h', White would have had no attractive continuation, and the game might have taken a complicated turn.




Figure 3 (101 - 150)


Figure 3 (101 - 150)

Black 5 was a key point, but White 6 made it clear that White was in the lead.

Black 7 was unrealistic, and was refuted by White 8.

White 18 was an overplay. White 22 would have been sufficient.

Not that it would have changed the outcome, but instead of 23, Black had a tesuji at 1 in Dia. 5. After 7, Black is a position to make further profit by descending at 'a'.



Dia. 5

Figure 4 (151 - 250)

Black resigns after White 250.




Figure 4 (151 - 250)

Ko: 65, 68, 71, 74, 77, 80, 83, 86, 89, 92, 95, 97 connects at 62. Ko: 119 (at 113), 122 (at 114), 125 (at 113), 133 (left of 128), 136 (at 128), 139 (left of 128), 142 (at 128). 144 takes 3 stones at 130.

Ma v. Schlemper

White: Ma Xiaochun (China)

Black: Ronald Schlemper (Netherlands)

According to Ma, his most difficult game was not the final against Miura, but his second-round game against Ronald Schlemper of the Netherlands. Although Schlemper had upset a Japanese opponent in the 1st World Amateur years ago and more recently had reached the number one spot in the Nihon Ki-in's insei league, his strong showing against Ma was still one of the surprises of the tournament. After narrowly losing this game, he handily won all the rest to finish in 9th place.




Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Figure 1 (1– 50)

Black 7 combines well with the star-point stone at 1.

Black 21 should have been 'a'. Black 23 should also have been played at 'a'.

However, the result through 49 is roughly even.




Figure 2 (51 – 100)

Figure 2 (51 – 100)

Black 53 was good, but Black 55 should probably have been omitted.

Black 59 was too conservative. Black should press in a line further, at 65.

Black 67 and 69 should also have been omitted; Black should just have played 71 and 73.

Black 71. Now that Black has played 67 and 69, he should continue at 75.

White 90 and 92 were mistakes. Both moves should have been played at 93, in which case Black would have had a fairly difficult position. When Black captured three stones with 99, it suddenly began to look as if he might well win.

Figure 3 (101 – 154)

Black 3 was perhaps the losing move. Black should have connected at 4. Even if he lost four stones that way, he would still be able to force White from above. When White captured at 4, the black group on the left side became weak.

White 8 was extremely large—about 17 points—and led to an unexpected ko.

If Black plays 23 at 24, he is slightly behind.

Hence Black 23, but White had ample ko threats to make 24 succeed. Although Black defended his left side group with 35 and 37 in sente, making territory in the process, and then got the large hane at 39, the bottom right corner was larger.




Figure 3 (101 – 154)

ko: 28, 31, 34




Figure 4 (155 – 224)


Figure 4 (155 – 224). After White 124, the two players fought the last one-point ko for another 68 moves, but White turned out to have one more ko threat. *Black 225 to White 292 omitted. White wins by 3½ points.*

(Translated by James Davies. More WAGC games in our next issue.)


Basic Fighting Techniques

Miyazawa Goro 7-dan

The three problems below all involve the same elementary tesuji. Anyone of mid-kyu strength should be able to solve them, while dan-level players should get them on sight. If you have any trouble, then this article may be what you need to bring your technique up to scratch.




1. Black to play (4-kyu)



2. Black to play (2-kyu)

Answers are given on page 49.




3. Black to play (shodan)

After the Joseki

Early Middle Game Strategy
Miyashita Shuyo 9-dan

Formulating a strategy in the early middle game can be quite difficult. Later in the middle game, once a fight has started, one's objective may become clear, but at the beginning of the middle game one may not know what to focus on.


This series aims to make your task a little easier by analysing the main themes in the follow-up fighting after a joseki has been played. It also hopes to make clearer the relationship between a joseki and the overall position.




Pattern Four

The approach move at White 1 up to the extension of Black 6 form a basic pattern for the 5-4 point. This is a long-established joseki, so most players are probably familiar with it. What are the follow-up aims of this pattern? We will look at the points to aim at from both Black's and White's point of view.

Dia. 1. First from Black's point of view. From common sense, the great majority of players would probably strike with the shoulder-



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

hit at Black 1. It's a common technique for attacking the vital point of White's shape, and there cannot be many players who haven't both used it and been on the receiving end of it. However, this aim is not by any means best in every situation. We will see the reason for this later, but be that as it may let's expand on the fighting that follows Black 1.


Dia. 2. White 1 to Black 4 are the most usual way of proceeding. Next White 5, attaching at the head of Black's stone, is a stylish tesuji. Naturally, if next Black 'a' then White will push out with 'b'.

Dia. 3. If Black blocks at 1, White cuts at 2 and after 4 and 6 his tesuji is stunningly effective. Against the marked white stone —

Dia. 4. Black should extend at 1. White then moves out smoothly with 2 and 4. This is another well-known sequence, since there are a lot of textbooks that give a lot of space to explaining




Dia. 3




Dia. 4

the tesuji of the marked white stone. However, I feel that they often neglect to point out that this same tesuji inevitably strengthens Black's position, which is quite a drawback. If the position is such that having Black strengthen himself with 3 and 5 is bad for White, then there is no reason for White to limit his options to playing this 'tesuji'. For example —


Dia. 5. There is nothing wrong with moving out with the ordinary move of 1. The sequence to 9 is one possible continuation. The main point is that, depending on the surrounding positions, playing your own game is much better than using some 'tesuji' that you have picked up from a book.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6




Dia. 7

Dia. 6. It probably isn't necessary to point out the hamete line of Black 1 and 3. It's mentioned here only for beginners. White 8 of course should be ...

Dia. 7. The cut at the bottom with White 1. Up to White 3, the result is bad for Black because of the cutting points left behind at 'a' and 'b'.


Dia. 8. The position in this diagram is only one example but, if the stones are arranged like




Dia. 8

this, rather than playing Black 'a', making White push out at 'b', playing Black 1 for outside influence and building a huge territory on the top side is probably more advantageous from the point of view of the overall position. It will gradually become clear that the large knight's move of Black 1 is a tesuji to gain outside strength, whereas Black 'c', played with the same intention, is not good enough (White answers at 'd').

Dia. 9. Against Black 1 the kosumi of White 2 is the correct shape. Letting Black take the vital point of 2 if White plays tenuki is unbearable. After Black 3, it is usual for White to tenuki, but jumping out to 'a' in order to avoid the next diagram is also possible.




Dia. 9




Dia. 10 6: tenuki

Dia. 10. When White tenukis, Black plays 1 (or Black 2, White 1, Black 5). At any rate, you should be aware of the fact that White can leisurely play elsewhere yet again. Because there is this danger that White may use 6 to take a good point somewhere else, one must be careful about the timing of Black 1.

Dia. 11. When Black plays 1, it looks as if White can counterattack with 2, but then Black cuts inside with 3 and connects at 5. If White



Dia. 11




Dia. 12


ataris at 6, then Black squeezes with 7 and 9. This is good for Black. How about extending at 9 instead of playing 6? Black 8, White 'a', Black 'b' follow. Except in very special circumstances White can't fight like this.

Dia. 12. Playing atari at 1 and connecting at 3 looks severe but it only induces the tesuji of White 4, so it's bad. You should be aware of the commonsense shape for both sides.


Dia. 13. White 1, anticipating the aims we have just discussed, is a splendid move. Black may take the opportunity to exchange Black 'a' for White 'b'. White's aim is to prepare for the invasion at 'c'.




Dia. 13



Dia. 14



Dia. 15



Dia. 16.


Dia. 14. Compared with the last diagram, the ordinary knight's move of White 1 is rather slow, but you should understand the aim of it, which is to press at 'a' in exchange for Black 'b'.

Dia. 15. You might also think of the shoulder hit of White 1 in order to gain outside strength, but expecting the moves up to 7 is a little over-optimistic. Instead of White 4 . . .


Dia. 16. Black will undoubtedly counterattack strongly with Black 1. Allowing Black to fight back with 5 is dubious so you must be cautious about using this aim.

Dia. 17. White can also attach at 1 to build up outside influence. If Black 4, White 5 presses and connecting solidly at 6 is a common tesuji. White can extend to 7 or hold back to 'a'. Whichever he plays, creating outside strength on the right side is a magnificent idea. This diagram is taken from a game by Honinbo Shusai which became known as a masterpiece.


Dia. 18. When White has added the marked stone, his aim is to invade at White 1. Attaching



Dia. 17



Dia. 18




Dia. 19


at 2 is the simplest answer for Black, but the moves up to White 7, with White stealing profit, are forced. Against the white triangled approach move jumping to Black 'a' is solid, but it is always difficult trying to decide between all the good territory-making points.

Dia. 19. The kosumi of Black 2, preventing White's connection to the left, shows a severer attitude than in Dia. 18. Even though White can still find a way to live, with 3 to 9, living locally cannot be seen as a success for White, because Black 10 aims at the vital point of 'a'. You must be careful over the timing when aiming at White 1.

Dia. 20. When White has prepared the way first by adding the triangled stone, Black 2 is dangerous.



Dia. 20



Dia. 21

Dia. 21. This diagram clearly shows the effect of the exchange of the black and white triangled stones.

(Kido, March 1970. Translated by Richard Hunter.)

Basic Fighting Techniques

Continued from page 46

Pattern 15: The Hanekomi

In Pattern 8, in Go World No. 21, the wedge (warikomi) was introduced. The hanekomi is a move wedging inside the opponent's one space jump formation while also being a hane from a friendly position. It belongs to a fairly high class of tesuji. The aim is violent and the effect of this stone, according to how it is used, is outstanding.






Illustration One: Black to play


The idea is to capture the white stones in the corner. They look connected, but there is a nice tesuji which will cleanly sever the string of stones.



Model Answer: hanekomi


The hanekomi of Black 1 is a clever move. Up to 3, White is cut into two. If Black plays 1 at 3, White moves out with White 'a', Black 1, White 'b', etc., and Black's attack is ineffective.






Dia. 5: no escape

Dia. 5. White might try to avoid disaster with 2, but this time Black stabs him from the other side with 3. If White 4, Black 5 catches him on the outside. There is no escape for White.



Problem Two: Black to play

Is there a move to capture the white stones at the top? Black needs to think up a tesuji to cut the connection. If he finds the right one, it will all be over.



Dia. 1: unable to cut Dia. 2: White escapes


Dia. 1. If Black attaches at 1, White hanes at 2 and it does not look good for Black. Even if Black cuts at 3, White 4 grabs one stone and nothing works.

Dia. 2. The crude atari at 1 leads nowhere. White answers at 2. Once you step into a maze, it is hard to back out, but it is just the time when it is necessary to think of a fresh approach.


Dia. 3. Black 1 strikes at the corner of the white stone and when White plays 2, the hanekomi at 3 works really well. Although Black seems to have weak shape, his stones are surprisingly strong.

Dia. 4. If White 4, Black 5 connects. The cuts above and below 4 are miai. There is no rescue for White.


Dia. 5. Even if White answers the hanekomi



Dia. 3: strike!




Dia. 4: cuts are miai




Dia. 5: success

with the cut at 4, and plays 6 and 8, he still is not alive. If White plays atari at 7 instead of playing 6, Black's answer at 6 is good. This is a blindspot and is a difficult shape to work out.



Problem Three: Black to play


The black group only has one eye and needs help. It is important to look carefully at White's weaknesses and then act.



Dia. 1: failure

Dia. 1. The hanekomi at 1 is good, but when White plays 2, connecting at 3 is feeble and success is rather unlikely. White connects at 4 and the blockbuster Black wanted to drop does not even have the effect of a firecracker.

Dia. 2. Black tries the cut at 1 instead of connecting at 3 in the previous diagram. White captures at 2 and connects at 4 and then nothing happens. The cut at 'a' instead of 1 is also the wrong cut. White answers at 'b' and it is no good




Dia. 2: the wrong cut

4: connects


for Black.

Dia. 3. First, the hanekomi at 1 and then, when White plays 2, cutting at 3 is the tesuji. This is the only road to victory.




Dia. 3: cut on the right

Dia. 4. When White continues at 4, the descent at 5 is worth a good look. The two white stones



Dia. 4: shortage of liberties



Dia. 5: can't connect

in the corner drop off and Black is alive.

Dia. 5. Continuing, if White plays at 6, the cut at 7 works nicely now and up to 9 White is stuck in damezumari (shortage of liberties.)

(‘Gekkan Go’, March 1979. Translated by Richard Hunter.)

Good and Bad Shape

Magari Reiki 9-dan


The principles of good and bad shape often seem like a mystery, only to be understood after years of intensive study and a lot of practical experience. They are not really so difficult. The criteria for good shape are simple: Does it work? Is it efficient? Does it hurt the opponent? If a move does not achieve its offensive or defensive aims, in the best and simplest way possible, then it is not good shape. With the above points in mind, this new series aims at analysing the basic fighting shapes of go.

2. Bad Kosumis

Black attaches at 1, making White extend at 2, then defends the corner with 3. This ever-popular ‘joseki’ often appears in handicap games played by low kyu players. It’s a bad habit only too easy to pick up when you feel insecure about your corners, but in this issue we hope to show you why it should be discarded.

If Black had a stone at ‘a’, Black 1 would create a target for attack by making White heavy.


If, however, Black’s purpose is solely to defend the corner, then he has to be criticized for helping White to strengthen himself.



Pattern A

That is the reason why Black 1 is a bad move. Once White plays 2, Black becomes worried about his weakness at the 3-3 point, so he hastens to defend with 3, oblivious to the fact that both his kosumis are bad. The sin of provoking White 2 is unforgiveable.

Dia. 1 (good shape). The simple descent at 1 is good shape: it strengthens the corner and aims at




Dia. 1

attacking the white stone.


Black is left with a slight defect at 'a', but that just means that White will be able to reduce his corner territory a little. If White actually invaded, Black would get compensating outside influence, so for the present this defect is nothing to worry about.

Both Pattern A and Dia. 1 are good for Black: the difference is that in Dia. 1 Black hasn't helped White to improve his shape.

Dia. 2 (forcing moves). The next step is to use tewari analysis to show why Pattern A is bad. After the moves there, it is White's privilege to play the forcing moves up to 7 here. This sequence effectively punishes Black for his bad moves.



Dia. 2




Dia. 3


Dia. 3 (tewari). The result in Dia. 2 is equivalent to the following: Black plays the correct corner move (the marked stone), but then spoils it by playing Black 1. Next –

Dia. 4. White next forces with 1 and 3, then with 5. So far Black's responses are natural, but next he answers 7 at 8, filling in his own territory for no reason.

Black 1 in Dia. 3 and 8 in Dia. 4 are both unbelievably bad, but the result is the same shape as in Dia. 2. This tewari analysis makes it clear why Pattern A is to be avoided.



Dia. 4




Dia. 5


Dia. 6 (good shape). When White already has the marked stones in place Black 1 is not a bad move. When White plays 2, his stones are over-concentrated (from a two-stone wall he would want a three-space extension), so Black 1 becomes a kikashi (forcing move).

If Black next wants to secure the corner, Black 3 is correct shape.

Dia. 6 (insecure). Simply defending with Black 1 in this case leaves Black with a weakness. As White is strong on the outside, he may aim at coming in at 2. The criteria for good shape change according to the overall position.




Dia. 6



Dia. 7

Dia. 7 (good shape). When the neighbouring white stones are extremely strong, as here, then Black 1 cannot be criticized.



Pattern B : bad shape

This is a whole-board position, but the idea is the same as in Pattern A. The aim of Black 1 and 3 is to sacrifice the marked stone, a strategy which in itself need not be criticized. However, Black's execution is faulty: once again he makes bad shape with a timid defensive move at the 3-3 point.

Dia. 1 (good shape). If Black wants to defend the corner, simply descending at 1 makes good shape. This move does not help White to strengthen himself and it leaves Black with the aji of 'a' and 'b' to aim at. In other words, the simple move at 1 has given the marked black stone a lot of aji, in contrast to Pattern B.


Dia. 2 (thorough-going). If Black is determined

Continued on page 35


The Great Joseki Debate

Honda Kunihisa 9-dan


How to choose a joseki in relation to the board as a whole is the theme of this debate. Black has just played the pincer (marked stone) in the lower left corner, and three proposals are being made for White's next move. Which one do you think fits the opening best?



Dia. A



Dia. B



Dia. C


A: I think I would just quietly come out with the one-space jump. Nothing could be as clear-cut or simpler. Isn't there a proverb to the effect that a one-space jump is never bad?

B: You can't win at go with just simplicity. Maybe what you're really saying is that you don't know any other josekis. It may be a little high level, but the large knight's move looks like an interesting move here.

C: I'm sorry, but I can't bring myself to play the half-hearted moves the two of you are suggesting. Why miss the chance to flatten Black? The outside attachment is a good, severe move here.

Fuseki Analysis

Since josekis work effectively in a certain direction, it is necessary to examine the positions along the adjacent sides and in the adjacent corners when choosing a joseki for a particular opening. Positions in the opposite corner are usually only a factor when a ladder is involved. In this issue's fuseki (fuseki diagram, next page), the position along the left side will determine the choice of joseki.




Fuseki Diagram

The first thing to notice about this fuseki is the position of the circled stone, which is often played one line below on the star-point. Its location one line closer to the stone above means that Black's position here is stronger. Since Black hopes to use this strength, White's strategy should be to neutralize it.


In the lower left, Black has the advantage two stones to one. As a result, White cannot play with impunity, and in a tussle can expect to be the one to give ground.

A Wins the Debate


White 1 in Dia. 1 is the right move for this opening. It leads to no difficult variations, so




Dia. 1




Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

its main feature is its simplicity.


This issue's problem comes about when Black plays the pincer at 2 in Dia. 2 against White's high approach.

The large knight's move in Dia. 3 has been a popular response in recent years and has given birth to a large family of variations. The move is actually a decoy, as White's real purpose is to settle himself in the corner.


The one-space jump in Dia. 4 has also been seen in games lately. The marked stone exerts pressure on White, but White 1 exerts pressure on Black in return.

The outside attachment in Dia. 5 is a willful move that aims at forcing Black into a low position. Black has strong countermeasures at his disposal, however, so in the local context this move is a little unreasonable.

When White jumps to 1 in Dia. 6, the moves to 5 can be expected, though the location of 5 is not fixed. The exchange of 1 and 3 for 2 and 4 is a territorial loss for White, but he hopes to make up for it by attacking at 5. Since Black cannot permit White 'a', he moves out with a move



Dia. 6




Dia. 7


like 'a' or 'b'. The fighting that follows has no fixed patterns.

In order for his counterattack with 5 to be productive, White should have a supporting position in the lower right corner. If instead the corner position is black, there is a danger that the pincer may turn into an overplay.

White can later aim at 1 and 3 in Dia. 7. Black usually fights back with 4 and 6 in Dia. 8, and White takes the corner profit with 7. However, Black must be careful that he does not come under attack if White exchanges 'a' for 'b' before capturing with 7.



Dia. 8




Dia. 9


Black can forestall the previous sequence with 1 and 3 in Dia. 9, but these moves are hard to play since they strengthen White and weaken the marked stone.

Instead of 2 in Dia. 6, Black can also choose the two-space jump in Dia. 10 when he wants to maintain balance with the top. The two-space jump is faster than the one-space jump and therefore thinner. Since White has no trouble making eye-shape, it places little emphasis on attack.


White 1 and 3 in Dia. 11 are one example. If




Dia. 10



Dia. 11




Dia. 12




Dia. 13

Black answers with 4 to 8 in Dia. 12, his position is too low, so he will resist with 4 in Dia. 13 instead. White then establishes a base in the corner with 5. White should not play these moves without forethought, however, since Black also gains by grasping the white stone with 4.


When Black plays the two-space jump in Dia. 14, White can pincer immediately around 'a'. He can do this because Black has no good follow-up move on the side and because he can press



Dia. 14




Dia. 15



Dia. 16

at 'b', forcing Black to jump to 'c'. With the one-space jump in Dia. 15, however, Black has a good follow-up at 1. Black 1 is the reason why White makes the extra jump in Dia. 16.

When White plays 1 and 3 in the fuseki in Dia. 17, Black is hard put for a good response. If he answers at 4, the circled stone is awkwardly placed. If the continuation to 7 is assumed, the overall position is already unfavourable for Black.




Dia. 17


The awkward position of the circled stone lets White aim at 1 in Dia. 18, so Black will have to be on his guard. White cannot play it immediately because Black will cut with 2 and 4.

If Black does not answer on the side after White 3 in Dia. 19 and tries, for example, 4 and 6, White breaks up the left side with the attachment at 7 (White 9 is also possible). White consolidates his position in the result to 13 while weakening the two circled stones above.


If the circled stone in Dia. 17 were on the star-point, then Black would have excellent shape on the side after the moves to 4 in Dia. 20. He could also consider switching to the bottom after the makeshift peep at 'a' (White connects at 'b') after White 3.



Dia. 18




Dia. 20




Dia. 19

B's Proposal

B proposed the large knight's move in Dia. 21, the purpose of which is to settle the shape immediately. Since there are too many variations to include in one article, we will take up only the most representative pattern.




Dia. 21




Dia. 22


Black usually replies with 2 in Dia. 22 in order to separate the two white stones. Since the White 'a' - Black 'b' exchange is bad, White hanes at 3 in Dia. 23. When he then pushes into the black stone with 5 after Black 4, his objective becomes clear: 1 in Dia. 21 induces the black attachment in Dia. 22 so that White can develop a sabaki shape. Black usually jumps to 6 next, but 'a' and 'b' are also possible.




Dia. 23



Dia. 24



Dia. 25




Dia. 26


White now has the choice of pushing at 'a' in Dia. 24 or making a hane at 'b'. If he pushes at 7 in Dia. 25, the joseki concludes with the sequence to 11.

The marked stone in Dia. 26 guards against Black's cutting with 1 and 3. Without it, White loses something after Black 'a'.


Playing 11 in Dia. 25 at 1 in Dia. 27 presupposes a ladder favourable for White. After 6 in




Dia. 27



Dia. 28




Dia. 29




Dia. 30

Dia. 28 Black is threatening 'a' and 'b'. After White 7 and 9 in Dia. 29, Black forces once at 10, then cuts at 12 to set up a ladder at 'a'. If the ladder favors Black, 'a' and 'b' are miai for him. Although White can escape from the ladder with 1 in Dia. 30, he cannot escape from the geta after Black 4. If this ladder does not favor White, White 1 in Dia. 27 is out of the question.

With the ladder in his favor, White jumps to 13 in Dia. 31 and wins the semeai by one move. Black's most dangerous move is 1 in Dia. 32, but if White answers correctly at 2, the marked white stone in Dia. 33 prevents Black from capturing him in a ladder.




Dia. 31




Dia. 32

White gains a slight local advantage over Black if he is able to play 1 in Dia. 27. Even though the ladder starting from Black 2 in Dia. 28 favors him, he will still look for an opportunity to play 4 to defend the cutting point. In this issue's fuseki, however, there is a black stone on the star-point in the upper right corner, so this variation is not available to White.

Instead of pushing at 7 in Dia. 25, White can also hane immediately at 7 in Dia. 34. After both



Dia. 33




Dia. 34


sides connect in Dia. 35, Black takes the good point at 10. White then patiently draws back at 11 to make miai of 'a' and 'b'. This settles his group.

Note that pushing at 3 after playing the hane at 1 in Dia. 36 is the wrong order. If Black answers at 'a', White 'b' returns to the joseki in Dia. 25, but White must be prepared for the hane at 4 since Black has been strengthened by 2.


Against 1 in the fuseki in Dia. 37, Black is only too happy to attach at 2. In the result to 11, the circled stone occupies an ideal position in relation to the black stones below. After the moves to 14 the game is promising for Black.




Dia. 35



Dia. 36




Dia. 37




Dia. 38

If White switches 7 in Dia. 37 to 1 in Dia. 38, the result is substantially the same. In this case, the marked stone has become light because White has answered at 3 and backed off to 5 in the corner. Though Black can continue at the bottom as in the previous diagram with Black 'a' — White 'b' — Black 'c' ('c' is not high this time), he can also attack the two stones in the upper right with 6. Positive play like this should tip the balance in his favor.


If the position of the circled stone in Dia. 37 is one line lower, as in Dia. 39, Black gets a poor result after the joseki to 11. Now the circled stone is too close to the black stones below, and he is open to an invasion at 'a'.



Dia. 39



Dia. 40




Dia. 41

With the position of the circled stone closer, the solid connection at 'a' in Dia. 40 is not necessary, so Black would probably drop down at 1. If White later blocks at 'b', Black can handle the fighting by dropping down at 'c'. The idea behind 1 is to take territory and to avoid overconcentration. This is a satisfactory position for Black.

The large knight's move at 1 in Dia. 41 lets White settle himself quickly in the corner, but it also lets Black develop thickness in the direction of 'a'. When Black already has a stone in place at 'a', White generally cannot expect a good result.


C's Proposal

C has suggested the outside attachment at 1 in Dia. 42. In the local context the attachment is somewhat unreasonable. Black has three answers, at 'a', 'b', and 'c'. Because of space limitations we will apply the variations to the fuseki directly without a separate detailed discussion of each.




Dia. 42


If Black hanes underneath at 2 in Dia. 43, he can hane again at 4 since the ladder favors him. This resembles one of the five-four point josekis, except that Black has already played the marked stone. The presence of this stone normally makes Black 4 a poor move, as is evident in the continuation in Dia. 44: once White has settled himself in the corner, Black's pincer becomes a non-urgent move.




Dia. 43




Dia. 44



Dia. 46



Dia. 45



Dia. 47

Since Dia. 44 is not good for Black, he will continue with 6 in Dia. 45 after 5 in Dia. 43. This is a strong move. Since the ladder does not favor him, White has to extend at 7, but after Black 10 the fighting will be difficult for him because of the circled stone.

Black does not play 4 in Dia. 43 at 5 because that makes his play too submissive when White attaches at 'a'.

When Black plays 2 in Dia. 46, he can resist strongly with 4 and 6 after White 3. When White turns at 7, Black pushes on top and builds outside strength while White takes the corner (15 without 13 is also possible). Locally the result is better for Black, but in this fuseki the circled

stone has become a bad move because White 7 has left Black open at the edge.

Black 2 and 4 in Dia. 47 are uncompromising moves. When White also answers strongly, the variations are numerous and complicated. White 5 and 7, however, are easy to understand and lead to the sequence to Black 14. White 15 can be expected next and gives a game with equal chances. Although White 13 is a good extension, Black has taken good profit in the corner.

Locally, White 5 at 9 is White's strongest reply, but in this fuseki it is unreasonable.

('Gekkan Gogaku', September 1981. Translated by David Thayer.)

Iwasaki Kenzo

by John Fairbairn

There is a significant sub-genre of European biographical literature in which Jewish children escape from a ghetto and get by by living, it seems, entirely on their wits. Religion apart, the story of the Japanese go player Iwasaki Kenzo would fall perfectly into this slot.

Born in 1842 in a village in Tokyo province, he was the second son of a relatively well-off farmer called Ebizawa. When young his name was Nabekichi.

He was noted as a gifted boy early on. He understood go at 7, and at 8 (all ages are by the exaggerated Oriental count — see note) was allowed, through the mediation of the famous player Ota Yuzo, to play Honinbo Shuwa on 9 stones. He won by 1 point, and it is said that of all the go prodigies Kenzo was probably the most prodigious.

His family were tenant farmers but they also ran an inn and, together with three other families, his father acted as village headman on a rota basis. It was fertile land and begot Mr. Ebizawa 14 little Ebizawas, which meant they were far from comfortable. Father was in any case a bad-tempered swindler who ruined the family fortunes, as a result of which he decided to entrust Kenzo to a Buddhist temple headed by a priest who had once been saved by Kenzo's father from imprisonment on a false charge.

The priest took good care of him, teaching him as befits a Buddhist cleric, but young Kenzo, like his father, was of a rather violent disposition. When the priest learnt that Kenzo was a go addict he decided to channel the boy's passions into the game. By the age of 8 Kenzo was too strong for his teacher, but before we go on there is a little story of this period.

It was about the time Kenzo and the priest were a match for each other. They would occasionally stake their meagre rations on the result of a game and on one occasion Kenzo was puzzled by a rather too easy victory which was explained only when the priest produced delicacies presented that day by families supporting the temple and guzzled the lot.

Towards the end of the year they again had a wager, this time for the next day's rations. This time it was Kenzo's turn to lose deliberately and the next day, as the priest was eating his double ration of rice-cakes and vegetables, Kenzo triumphantly produced and made off with a bag of sugar received as a New Year offering. "You villian," laughed the priest, "you've got revenge for last time!"

As that story illustrates, the temple was hard up and though the priest managed to send Kenzo off to Tokyo to be a pupil of Ota Yuzo there were many times when he could not scrape together the tuition fees and Kenzo had to return to the temple.

Eventually the priest died and Kenzo made up his mind to become an errand boy-cum-apprentice to a greengrocer in Tokyo. At the same time he secretly apprenticed himself to the Honinbo family, but when his greengrocer found out he was furious and gave him a month's notice. Kenzo was all of 12 years old.

But to revert to the priest for a moment and a famous anecdote: when he was dying the doctor said that the only thing that might help was a rare kind of rhubarb medicine which was very expensive. Overhearing this Kenzo determined to get hold of some. He planned to do this by playing go for stakes but found he had only 10 small coins as his stake. Undaunted he went ahead and even against the wily professional go gamblers he had soon increased his stake a hundred-fold by going from village to village. Overjoyed he set off home only to be waylaid by a robber. There was no escape, but Kenzo girded up his childish loins and said defiantly to the robber, "Take all my clothes if you have to, but my money is to buy medicine for a very sick man. You'll have to kill me to get it!"

The robber was moved and offered to escort Kenzo home, saying, "This neighborhood is infested with thieves." But the medicine was to no avail.

Now the 12-year-old Kenzo was tantamount to an orphan, but his plight came to the attention of a wealthy man called Yoshizawa Bunzo, who, despite being a commoner, was a man of some refinement. Apart from poetry he also studied go at Yasui Sanchi's go school where he was 2-dan. This man sym-

pathised with Kenzo and rescued him. He adopted him and sent him, in 1857, to be a student of the Yasuis (where does a proper education come in all this?).

It was then that the youngster first took the name Kenzo. Now he was studying properly with veteran go players such as Onizuka, Nakamura Shohei, etc. and improving his skill perceptibly.

At 15 (Oriental count, remember) he was 1-dan (that is, in 1857) and went up through the ranks at the rate of one dan per year to 4-dan. He reached 5-dan in 1862 after beating Shuho 6-dan (later Honinbo).

During these five years Kenzo lived a stable life for the first time. Despite his rapid promotion he was regarded as idle, or a sleepy-head, by the rest of the Yasui household because he went to bed earlier and got up later than all the other pupils.

In fact he was getting up at the crack of dawn to study (which was not long after most of the others had gone to bed). It was the only quiet time of the day and he had cannily chosen a bed near an eastern window for this purpose.

One day he was studying the games of San'ei, Yasui Sanchi's son. He became incensed with the clumsy efforts of San'ei, who was only 10, and belted him. San'ei ran crying to his mother and father got angry. But when the Yasui patriarch heard the circumstances he burst out laughing and told San'ei to make sure he did better in future.

Kenzo's zeal for study showed itself in other ways. At 17 (that is, when he was 3-dan), having scrimped and scraped to save the tuition fees he received at odd places, he had amassed the huge sum of 5 ryo (say, 50 dollars). Taking this he called on Honinbo Shusaku and applied for a teaching game. Shusaku was then 30. Though only 7-dan he was heir to the Honinbo title and was generally regarded as the strongest player in Japan. The kind-hearted Shusaku readily consented and said, "Since your feelings are sincere enough the fee is unnecessary." But Kenzo forced the money on him, saying that that would set a bad example.

Shusaku was impressed and allowed him to play 10 games at 2 stones. By then Kenzo was 7-3 ahead so that, following the rule of adjusting the handicap when one side is four games ahead, they switched to alternating two stones and black (first move). Shusaku then won three straight games, but a wealthy admirer thought Kenzo's results remarkable and presented him with a splendid kimono. The delighted youngster took it home, but his master, Yasui, was not so pleased. "These clothes do not become you," he said. "You are only 3-dan. Give them to me for safe keeping until you are 5-dan." Kenzo agreed, declaring that then his joy at becoming 5-dan would be truly exceptional.

When he finally reached 5-dan he was taken on a trip by a patron called Okubo Koto. At Okubo's insistence Kenzo was to change his name to Suzaemon and to pretend he was not very strong. In Osaka they came across a go clique headed by a lady 3-dan called Sakanaya Okuni who would not take black against anybody (because she never had, she said).

The obviously "important" Okubo, however, managed to prevail on her to take black against Kenzo (or rather, Suzaemon), warning her that he was apt to get violent if he couldn't have White.

Reluctantly Okuni began to play and Suzaemon purposely avoided playing josekis and egged on Okuni. Finally, of course, he ended up winning by capturing a large group and the impressed spectators remarked that if he were only to study josekis he was sure to become famous (unaware, like all amateurs, that "for every joseki you learn you become two stones weaker," to quote one of the less well-known proverbs).

Okubo enjoyed the joke immensely, and the local go clique, especially its star Okuni, was crestfallen.

Among the spectators, however, there was one man who had been watching unobtrusively. When the rumpus died down he was noticed and was urged to play. When asked his name he said: "Yoshiwara Fuminosuke," but when he sat down opposite Suzaemon he asked, with a piercing look, "What did you say *your* name was?"

Kenzo knew he had been found out but hesitated. The stranger pressed him: "If you don't tell, may I?" At this Okubo threw in the towel and admitted Kenzo's real name, but the stranger and Kenzo went on to play three games, of which Kenzo won two.

After the last game Kenzo said, "How did you know who I was?" To which Yoshiwara replied that

seeing how Kenzo played go he was certain he could be no weaker than 5-dan, and the only high-dan player he was not personally acquainted with was Kenzo.

Now although Kenzo was being touted round by Okubo, he didn't particularly relish it. He was headstrong, said some. Others said he was haughty and some (especially his pupils later) said he was heartless. He was certainly blunt and imbued with a stubbornness that at its best can be translated into moral courage. The refined Tokyo-ites, with their exaggerated politeness, were put out by his forthrightness, especially on first acquaintance. It was said that his manner, as well as his obstinacy and dislike of losing, won him many of his games in Hoensha.

In later life he tended to treat criticism of his attitude as a fly buzzing around his head, but as a youth he was not so restrained. It came to his ears one day that Okubo, who was almost shodan, had been telling people that Kenzo was not so much his go teacher as his go counsellor. This enraged Kenzo. "You can have eight or nine counsellors and if one is missing it's easy to replace him," he shouted. "But remove a high-dan player and he's not so easy to replace."

Unfortunately for Kenzo, the go world was collapsing just as he was coming into his prime. The astute Kenzo was one of the first to realise what was happening and to get out. He tagged along with Okubo, despite his objections to his attitude, and was happy to use his influence to get a job in the civil service when he was 20 in 1862. At first he was an officer in the Fire Department in the bottom grade, but in 1873, when Okubo left for Taiwan, he transferred to a job as a clerk of court and toured areas around Nagasaki and Kyoto. Despite his lowly civil service grade he was well connected and on occasion received presents from the former shogun's family.

Engaged as a budding bureaucrat he neglected go, or at least the professional side of it. He did, however, perfunctorily attend meetings of the principal professional go association of the Meiji times, Hoensha, and was awarded 6-dan there in 1887. Nevertheless he continued in his semi-professional capacity for 30 years until 1892 when he left his office job for the administrative job of Vice-President of Hoensha.

He proved to be a successful manager and in 1894 was promoted to 7-dan. In 1899 he was promoted to 8-dan and succeeded Nakagawa Kamesaburo as head of Hoensha.

Being away from the mainstream of the go world he obviously had little chance to cross swords with Honinbo Shuei, who led the main opposition to Hoensha. There had only been one encounter between them before he became head of Hoensha and that was around 1895–96 in a private meeting. The game was left unfinished but there is no doubt that Kenzo was the stronger.

This had repercussions 10 years later when Shuei became Meijin. Kenzo immediately issued a challenge, not so much to gain the Meijinship but to object to the promotion (the Meijin, or 9-dan, was supposed to be out on his own as the strongest player). He cited the unfinished game of a decade before.

It would have been a grand occasion: the head of the Honinbos against the head of Hoensha. But Shuei pleaded illness and offered his star pupil, Shusai, in his place. Kenzo declined this, as he was expected to do, but made great play of his claim that Shuei was scared of an old man (he was now 64). No-one can say who would have won of course, but certainly Shusai was then no match for him as he was still taking two stones from Shuei. Shusai was then 23 and had played Kenzo twice before, but both times the games had been left unfinished because of Shusai's slowcoach tactics.

Kenzo proposed, as a separate venture, that Shusai should play him "properly" and Shusai agreed. Callow youth.

This time, whenever Shusai made a move Kenzo would fold his arms and start pondering, perhaps occasionally gazing out into the garden — but definitely not playing.

(As to what go players think about at times like this I don't know, but there is a nice story from modern shogi: during the Meijin match the challenger Yonenaga sat for four hours before making a move. When asked reverently by a reporter after the game what great schemes he had been concocting, Yonenaga said, 'None. There's an umbrella out there in the garden, stuck in the middle of the lawn. I was trying to work out what the hell it's doing there.' It had been left there by another reporter, incidentally, when a brief shower had ended.)

Anyway, at one point the aged Kenzo remained with his arms folded from 10 in the morning to 5 at

night, without making a play. The game went on for three days and two nights, with Kenzo reportedly looking as fresh as ever at the end of it while Shusai's eyes were in urgent need of matchsticks. During the encounter the hostess, Mrs. Takada Tami (a famous Svengali-like figure in Meiji go), had, despite her amazement, kept a constant supply of food going. Kenzo went on shovelling it down lustily while Shusai could only pick at it. Finally, on the evening of the third day, Shusai flaked out and at Mrs. Takada's insistence the game was suspended. Shuei, no doubt mightily relieved not to be there, thought it would have been close. Shusai in later years recalled this game as the most painful of his life.

Kenzo continued as active head of the Hoensha until he ceded the job to Ishii Senji in 1912. He died of cancer of the tongue in October 1915, one of the few go players to utter famous last words, to his doctor Okamoto. (There are, however, differing versions.)

'I am seized by an unexpected devil. I must go. This happens to every man once in his life. No matter. I should resign. Dr. Kondo thinks the same. No better move now . . . resign with good grace . . . give instructions to Dr. Kondo . . . it is time to surrender.'

Below is the game thought to be the one in which Kenzo tried to defeat Shusai through superior stamina.




Figure 1 (1 – 50) 46: ko

White: Iwasaki Kenzo 7-dan

Black: Tamura Hoju (later Shusai) 4-dan

Begun on 9 December 1896. Play suspended after 166 moves.

Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Viewed locally, the 24–25 exchange is a loss for White, but it takes the pressure off his group at the top (8 etc.).

Black 35. If at 37, White 38, Black 47, White 43 probably follow.

Figure 2 (51 – 100)

Black 61. Jumping to 'a' would be safer. Since he is forced to connect at 89, the ko fight is a failure for Black.

Figure 3 (101 – 166)

White 6. If at 'a', Black 41 would put White on




Figure 2 (51 – 100)
Ko: 69, 72, 75, 78, 85, 88




Figure 3 (101 – 166)

the spot.

Black 11. Playing lightly by attaching at 15 also looks possible. White launches a menacing attack with 22.

Black 37. If Black 38, then White 'b', Black 37, White 49.

The result of the furikawari (exchange) to 59 seems to be slightly favourable for White. The game is extremely close.

(Commentary from *The Complete Games of Honinbo Shusai*. Commentator not named.)

Note on Japanese ages. In the traditional Japanese system for calculating a person's age, a baby was considered one year old at birth and became two years old at the following New Year. It was thus possible for a baby less than a month old by the Western reckoning to be considered to be two years old by the Japanese system.

The Complete Games of Honinbo Shusai gives only five games with Iwasaki Kenzo, none of which was completed. The first was a two-stone game in 1889, the second another two-stone in 1890, the third, the game above, in which Shusai progressed to black without a handicap, the fourth and fifth in 1898 (Shusai had black in both). Nine of Iwasaki's games with Shusaku are given in *Invincible: The Games of Shusaku* (in which he appears as Ebizawa Kenzo).




Figure 1 (1 – 55)

Below is the first game Shusai and Kenzo played. Unfortunately, there is no commentary.

White: Iwasaki Kenzo 6-dan

2-stones: Tamura Hoju (Shusai) 1-dan

Played in April 1889. Play suspended after 120 moves.




Figure 2 (56 – 120)


62: connects; 91: ko; 94: ko

Here is the second two-stone game. (The 1898 games only went to 51 and 40 moves!)

White: Iwasaki Kenzo 7-dan

2-stones: Tamura Hoju 1-dan

Played on 13 July 1890. Play suspended after 76 moves.



(1 – 76)

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